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ABSTRACT
DISPARITIES IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF MUNICIPAL SERVICES
by
ROBERT MARLAY
Submitted to the Department of Civil Engineering and to the Department
of Urban Studies and Planning on June 25, 1971 in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degrees of Master of Science and Master in
City Planning.
This research addresses the subject of disparities in the distribution
of municipal services. Municipal services, in this study, include
refuse collection, rat control, the installation and maintenance of
storm and sanitary sewerage, curbs and gutters; street and sidewalk
surfacing and repair, street cleaning, snow clearing, street lighting
and traffic control; the provision of water, gas and electricity; police
and fire protection; and the provision of open space, recreational
facilities and other environmental amenities. Numerous cases of
disparities are documented and the sampling suggests that the problem
is widespread and that the magnitude of unegual treatment is often
quite large. Ethical and legal arguments are offered in support of
more equitable distributions. Legitimate standards by which equity
might be determined are discussed and the practical difficulties of
implementing these are exposed.
From several sources of information, including the author's research
of Cambridge, Massachusetts, the nature of the "process" which
determines hrnw municipal services are distributed is conceptualized
and explicitly modelled. Relying upon this conceptualization, the
discussion then offers to explain why disparities exist and suggests
that those most commonly denied adequate municipal services are best
characterized as powerless and poor. Lastly, the strategies of political
incorporation, citizen involvement, confrontation, litigation, legislation,
subsidization, research and innovation are briefly mentioned, and some
speculations are made upon the implications of their possible successes,
As an aid in understanding the long range effects of different
combinations of strategies, the distributive process was modelled on a
computer and several strategies were simulated with insightful results,
and these are referenced at several points in the discussion.
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In the Appendices, a study relating participation rates in the
consumption of public services to socio-economic factors is
summarized, a listing of the computer model for the distributive
process for refuse collection is provided, and the author's analytical
work concerning the routing of public sector vehicles is presented
as one illustration of the many possible applications of research and
innovation to municipal service systems.
It is concluded that disparities in the distribution of municipal
services seem destined to exist, not because there is a lack of
strategies which can eradicate them, but because their existence
appears to be an essential thread woven into the fabric of stable
communities. Disparities appear to have a necessary and desirable
function for all concerned. This is not to say, however, that anyone
should be denied adequate municipal service, and towards this goal
many -strategies can be applied.
Supervisor:
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the new industrial towns, the most elementary
traditions of municipal service were absent. Whole
quarters were sometimes without water even from local
wells. On occasion the poor would go from house to
house begging for water. . . . Open drains represented,
desnite their foulness, comparative municipal affluence
. . . . Block after block repeats the same formation:
there are the same dreary streets, the same shadowed,
rubbish-filled alleys, the same absence of open spaces
. . . . [TIhose who speak glibly of urban improvements
during this period . . . fight shy of actual facts:
they generally impute to the town as a whole, benefits
which only the more favored middle-class minority
enjoyed. . 1
In the above passage, Mumford describes the residential environment
of the new industrial towns of nineteenth-century England, yet his
depiction of the past is hauntingly similar to those of urban and rural
slums today.
Ghettos have long been characterized by poor municipal services. 2
Today, the familiar expression of the "wrong side of the tracks" elicits
imagery, like that above, of the conditions resulting from the lack or
inadequacy of such services: dimly lit, unrepaired, and often unpaved
streets, rat colonies, accumulations of garbage, trash strewn in vacant
lots, stagnant water at clogged sewer catch basins, unswept streets and
inadequate traffic control. In sharp contrast, the more affluent
neighborhoods under the samemunicipal jurisdiction usually receive
municipal services so conscientiously that the inhabitants are rarely
reminded of their vital importance. Such disparities in the distribution
-7-
of municipal services among residents can be perceived in nearly
every city and town in the country.
Yet evidence clearly shows that the impoverished are in no way
less concerned about receiving adequate municipal services than are-
other segments of the population. The Report of the National Advisory
Commission on Civil Disorders specifically cites as unrelenting sources
of irritation and frustration the environmental conditions resulting
from the non-existence or inadequacy of rat extermination, street
3
cleaning and refuse collection services. The Report also notes:
"According to one Sanitation Commissioner, . . . residents bordering on-
slums feel that sanitation and neighborhood cleanliness is a crucial
issue, relating to the stability of their blocks and constituting an
important psychological index of 'how far gone' their area is. It must
be concluded that slum sanitation is a serious problem in the minds of
the poor. . . ."4 Furthermore, as evidenced by legal suits in various
5
parts of the country on behalf of the poor, services other than those
strictly relating to sanitation are also perceived to be important by
the lower classes. These include the provision of stormwater drainage
facilities and sanitary sewers, street and sidewalk surfacing and repair,
street lighting, water supply and traffic control.
This argument alone suffices to say that municipal services
should be distributed more equitably, but there are other compelling
arguments. The Report links inadequate municipal services to domestic
crises. "Virtually every episode of urban violence . . . was
foreshadowed by an accumulation of unresolved grievances by ghetto
residents against local authorities. . . . So high was the resulting
underlying tension that routine and random events, tolerated and
ignored under most circumstances . . . became triggers of sudden
violence. . . . Evidence . . establishes that a substantial number
of Negroes were distrubed and angry about local government's failures
1 6
to solve their problems." Of these problems,. the insecurity of self
and property and poor health and sanitation conditions were cited
among the most important. "Inadequate sanitation services are viewed
by many ghetto residents not merely as instances of poor public service
7
but as manifestations of racial discrimination." Furthermore, the
levels of services provided by municipalities appear to be correlated
to such health indicators as rat bites per thousand children, maternal
and infant mortality rates and life expectancy. This link alone,
however vague it may be, carries with it implications of awesome
responsibility on the part of administrative officials. Inadequate
police protection has often been cited as contributing to the higher
8
crime rates (35 times higher in some instances ) in the lower income
Negro districts.
Lastly, the levels of municipal services are important indicators
of governmental efficacy. Poor services are interpreted by residents
simply as municipal neglect--an interpretation which easily fans the
fires of discontent, and which is amplified in areas where high
population density creates more intense needs for services and where
the lack of open space and the uses of streets as outdoor living rooms
-9-
and recreational areas produce higher visibility and sensitivity to the
conditions resulting from poor services.
Summarizing, municipal services are as important or more so to
the disadvantaged as they are to the more affluent, inadequate services
have been linked to social unrest and the levels of municipal services
are often used as valid indicators of governmental efficacy despite how
well the government might perform other more intangible services.
Furthermore, there is an underlying feeling pervading all these arguments
that municipal services should be distributed equitably and without
regard to racial, social or economic factors. Yet vast disparities
persist.
In the face of this persistence, two questions emerged to motivate
this thesis: why do they persist, and what can be done about them? The
goal is clear--to ameliorate the suffering, in some cases, and irritation,
in others, of those who bear the consequences of poor municipal services
by achieving some measure of equity in both their quantitative and
qualitative distributions.
In an effort to contribute towards the achievement of this goal,
the research effort undertook four objectives: (1) to confront some of
the issues surrounding the subject of municipal services and their
distribution, to examine more closely the meaning of "equity" and to
expose some of. the difficulties in trying to apply certain standards of
fairness to the distributive process, (2) to conceptualize the nature of
the overall process which determines how municipal services are distributed
among various residents in a municipality, and to model those elements
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in the process which create and perpetuate disparities, (3) to test the-
hypothesis that the negative effects of disparities fall largely upon two
specific segments of the population: the powerless and the poor, and
(4) to outline some strategies which might help to secure relief for the
"excluded" in society and to discuss the limitations of these strategies
and the implications of their successes.
The scope of this research was limited to "municipal services," a
very ambiguous phrase as it is used today. Some have used the phrase
literally and have allowed its meaning to continually change with the
expanding roles of municipal governments and with the growing numbers
and kinds of services which are provided. Thus, it is often used to
connote the entire spectrum of services provided by a municipality.
Others maintain that municipal services are distinct from urban services,
social services, public services and other categories and include only
specific types of services which relate to the physical maintenance
of the city and which are primarily provided by public works departments.
In any case the phrase is suffering an identity crisis and needs some
helpful clarification.
In this study, the following services are typical examples of
those included in the scope of research: refuse collection, the
installation and maintenace of stora and sanitary sewerage, curbs and
gutters; street and sidewalk surfacing and maintenance, street cleaning,
snow clearing, street lighting and traffic and parking control; the
provision of water for domestic use and for fire protection, the
domestic utilities of electric power and gas supply; police and fire.
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protection; and the provision of open space, recreational facilities,
tree plantings and whatever other amenities for which a municipality
has chosen to be responsible.
If pressed for a conceptualizing definition, the author would
suggest that municipal services include all those services which are
provided or regulated by a local municipality and which contribute to
the quality of the immediate environment of municipal residents.
The immediate environment of a municipal resident consists simply of
his dwelling unit, its surrounding space, including streets, sidewalks,
yards, alleys, and an agglomeration of other dwelling units. In this
study it is extended to include also nearby recreational areas and open
spaces, if they so exist. The focus is upon disparities in the
distribution of municipal services among residents and,. therefore, the
above definition reflects this boundary. It is recognized, of course,
that municipal services even as defined above are provided to commercial,
industrial and public areas as well. By restricting the definition to
the immediate residential and recreational environment many other services
which might be provided by a municipal government are intended to be
excluded from consideration here. Among these are the public services of
education, health and hospital; the intangible services of planning,
zoning, judication, and administration; the social services of job-
training, employment centers, legal aid, welfare and other forms of
income redistributive programs; and other services which are primarily
intended for the commercial, industrial and other economic interests
within the boundaries of a municipality. The residential environment
-12-
was chosen as the focus of this study simply because it is in this
environment that the greatest human suffering occurs as a result of poor
or inadequate services.
Recalling the four objectives of this thesis, each was met with
varying degrees of success. Chapter II documents certain instances of
disparities in the distribution of municipal services, provides a more
specific portrayal of the general problem of disparities, raises some
of the more controversial issues and arguments surrounding the question
of equity and exposes the difficulties in trying to quantify the needs
of residents for services and to measure different service levels. Chapter
III examines the nature of the overall distributive process and constructs
a conceptual model (accompanied by a series of nine schematic diagrams
9
resembling those used by Jay Forrester in his Urban Dynamics Model )
of this process from four principal sources: the author's personal
observations and those of four others who participated in a ten-week
summer study of municipal service systems in Cambridge, Massachusetts;10
Gordan's research of refuse collection and street cleaning services in
11
Boston; the publications of related research efforts in the broader
field of public services; and legal literature regarding the existence
of disparities in the distribution of municipal services. From these
sources is also drawn evidence that supports the hypothesis that those
segments of the population most frequently denied adequate municipal
services can indeed be characterized as powerless and poor: for those
services which are provided free-of-charge and which are largely allocated
by municipal officials, the powerless (meaning the politically alienated,
-13-
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educationally deprived and otherwise disadvantaged) are excluded by
their inability to compete aggressively for their share or to resist
poor quality, and for those services which are provided with service
charges or user charges affixed, both the powerless and the poor are
excluded by their inability to have services placed "on the. market"
in their neighborhoods and to resist poor quality, and by their
inability to afford the direct costs of using or consuming the services.
Chapter, IV, lastly, outlines several broad strategies (litigation,
citizen participation and confrontation, legislation, subsidization,
research and innovation) and speculates upon the consequences of
their implementation.
Keeping in mind this overview and the points raised earlier,
the discussion now turns to the issues surrounding the topic of this
research.
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II. EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION: FACTS, ISSUES AND MEASUREMENT CONSIDERATIONS
In the Introduction it was argued that the existence of disparities
in the distribution of municipal services isa oroblem worthy of concern
and that the attainment of some measure of equity in their distribution
is a goal worthy of achieving. Although one may agree in principle with
both of these statements, the path towards an equitable distribution is
cluttered with arguable issues and practical difficulties. This chapter
serves as an introduction to many of these.
An attempt will be made first to provide a more specific
understanding of the general problem and to suggest its scope by
documenting certain instances of disparities in the distribution of
municipal services. Then several "standards of fairness" which a
municipality might use to justify these disparities are presented and
discussed in order to raise the controversial issues surrounding the
question of equity. And lastly, two other standards are presented which
seem appropriate in light of recent court decisions, but which,
unfortunately, are burdened by the difficulties of quantifying needs and
measuring service levels.
A. DOCUMENTATION OF DISPARITIES
Few studies exist which specifically document uneaual treatment in
the provision of municipal services. Those that do, however, suggest
that the problem is widespread, occurring in large urban areas and in small
-15-
rural towns throughout the country, and. that the magnitude of disparity
can be devastatingly large.
In the small rural town of Shaw, Mississippi, even though 60
percent of the town's 2,500 residents are black, white areas monopolize
the sewers, fire hydrants, water mains, sidewalks, street lights and
traffic lights. A mere 3 percent of black homes front on paved streets
compared with 99 percent of white homes. While the town has recently
acquired a significant number of medium and high intensity mercury vapor
street lighting fixtures, every one of them has been installed in white
neighborhoods. Similar statistics regarding other local improvements
exist and are undisputed by municipal officials. 12
In Boston, Massachusetts, the predominantly white and middle to
upper income residential area of Beacon Hill receives street cleaning
services twice a week and refuse collection services three times a
week during all seasons of the year. Meanwhile in another Boston district,
Roxbury, a predominantly black and low income area which is equally
densely populated, receives these services only once a week during most
of the year, and receives refuse collection twice a week only in the
13
summer months. In Cambridge, Massachusetts, 35 percent of the city's
residents receive preferential treatment in the provision of "barrel-
rolling" (the rolling of refuse containers from the house to the curb)
before collection, but very few of the residents in the low income
Model Cities area receive this service. 4
In Cleveland, Ohio, police provide inferior services to the
predominantly Negro neighborhoods. Residents have testified, for example,
-16-
that the police knowingly allow gambling and prostitution to thrive in
Negro areas, but vigorously prohibit them in other areas. Cleveland
police have been charged with racial discrimination in that they always
investigate criminal complaints against blacks but frequently ignore
those against whites. The police are also said to respond very slowly,
if at all, to calls for help from predominantly black neighborhoods.
An intensive study of Cleveland police records in 1965 found that the
police waited on the average 50 percent longer from the time of receiving
a call for help to the time of directing a -police car to respond. These
times for the predominantly black 5th district were averaged at 13.69
minutes, but were averaged at 8.49 and 9.27 minutes for the
predominantly white 1st and 2nd districts respectively. In response to
robbery calls the police took more than four times as long in the 5th
15
district as in the other two.
Fragmentary evidence supports the widely-held belief that cities
do not maintain streets, sidewalks and sewers equally in their different
neighborhoods. Citizens in Shaw and Itta Bena allege that each town
repairs and maintains the streets and sidewalks in its white
16
neighborhoods, but refuses to do so in its black areas. In Cambridge,
officials claim that sewer catch basins are cleaned out at least once
every three years, but evidence shows that some basins in a low-income
area had not been cleaned out in nine years despite complaints of
17
flooding. The Boston Sunday Globe reports more streets are in bad
condition in the Roxbury and South Dorchester sections than in other
neighborhoods.18
-17-
one investigation of a major midwestern city revealed that
certain high income areas had more than eleven times the amount of
public recreational space available for each 10,000 people than certain
19
low income neighborhoods. And Boston has been accused of providing
less adequate staffing for its playgrounds in Roxbury than in other
20
areas.
B. STANDARDS BY WHICH TO MEASURE EQUITY
The pattern of disparities in the distribution of municipal
services described above does not appear to be simply a matter of chance.
Instead, cities appear to provide inferior services to the poor and
the racial minorities. In view of the evidence, one would conclude that
such treatment on the part of local government is inequitable. But
how does on arrive at this conclusion? What standards are being implicitly
applied to the evidence in the process of deciding what is equitable and
what is not?
In the case of Shaw, Mississippi, one might feel that an
equitable distribution of local improvements would be one in which equal
or similar percentages of black and white homes fronted on paved streets,
received sanitary sewerage and so on. Another might feel that a measure
of equity would be equal per capita expenditures on local improvements
in each area. A third person might feel that these standards are
inappropriate and suggest that local improvements should be distributed
in accordance with property valuations or with the amount of taxes each
property owner paid.
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In the case of the Cleveland police, one might argue that equal
response times to calls for help from all neighborhoods would be
equitable; another might counter by noting that the number of calls in
the 5th district is much greater than in the other districts, and that
50 percent greater time delays are in fact reasonable when one considers
the pressures under which the department is working. In Boston, one
neighborhood receives three times the refuse collection frequency of
another, and this is felt to be inequitable; but in New York City,
ghetto areas receive two times the refuse collection frequency of other
areas, and this is not felt to be inequitable. The higher frequency,
it is argued, reflects the greater needs of the ghetto area, and so on.
Clearly, many different standards are being applied in these
arguments about what is equitable. out of this discussion should emerge
the realization that the meaning of equity is subject to vastly different
interpretations among different individuals and that the "standard"
which one chooses to apply is simply an instrument which one uses in a
debate to defend a certain value position. As. such, each standard seems
in reality to be little better than another.
This realization precipitates two philosophical approaches to the
problem of disparities. One is an "amoral" approach. The philosophy of
this approach holds that a certain distribution of municipal services is
neither right nor wrong, that the allocation of services is not a process
which can be subjected to arguments and compromise, but a process which
must be coerced with pressure, influence and power to provide better
services to the disadvantaged. The second is the "legal" approach. The
-19-
philosophy of this approach holds that there are, indeed, standards of
fairness which are prevalent in society, that these have been internalized
and institutionalized by society in the form of readily cognizable
principles embodied in law, and that these can be applied with success
to the processes of distribution. In truth, each approach has merit
and need not be pursued exclusively from the other. Although numerous
strategies might be envisioned at this point, they will not be discussed
or analyzed here, but in Chapter IV after the distributive process as a
whole has been examined and conceptualized in Chapter III.
Instead, the author wishes here to play out further some of the
various explanations which might be arguable in a court of law, if one
were to elect the strategy of litigation, in order to raise explicitly the
controversies surrounding the question of equity and to expose the
practical -difficulties inherent in the problem of measuring. disparities.
It should be acknowledged that the author has borrowed most of the
legal insights which appear below from the works of others in the fields
21
of civil rights, civil liberties and poverty law.
In reality, it is highly unlikely that a city distributes its
municipal services according to any consciously applied standard. Instead
the patterns of quantitative and qualitative distributions develop deep
within the complex structure of municipal bureaucracy, and the
sociocultural and economic forces and unarticulated biases operate, if
at all, only implicitly. In a court of law, however, a municipality will
be asked to explain, in terms of some reasonable and acceptable standard,
why disparities exist.
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One explanation which might be offered is that the differential
distribution is the result of historical and traditional practices, and
its rationality is based on the theory that the duration of any
practice for long periods of time carries -with it its own approval. But
in the light of a recent ruling by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
in Hawkins v. Shaw, 2 2 this explanation appears to be unacceptable.
Even though the Town of Shaw claims that it now provides municipal
services equally to all new developments, black and white, the court
ruled that such a policy was not sufficient to justify disparities
when the effect of such a policy is to "freeze in" the results of oast
discrimination.
Another standard which might be used to justify the existence
of disparities between upper income and lower income neighborhoods,
is that of "municipal taxes paid." The racial minorities and the
poor pay fewer municipal taxes than the rest of the populace, and there
may be some feeling among courts and city officials that those who
pay less should receive less. on the surface, at least, this argument
seems plausible. The city would claim that its legitimate purpose is
to dispense services in a business-like manner, charging people for
what they get, or giving people what they pay for. Furthermore, the city
might argue that such a method of distribution would be eminently "fair"
to the taxpayer. It is clear, for example, that some services are
charged for, such as the utilities, on a "user fee" basis. But since
other services may not be so amenable to service charging, because they
-21-
cannot be quantified so easily, because the administrative expenses for
billing would be excessive and other reasons, the city might argue that
it can rightfully approximate the "user-fee" model by assessing general
taxes of all residents and then distributing services accordingly.
Although this standard has yet to be challenged in the courts, there
are several arguments which can be offered in refutation. The main
argument is that the purpose of municipal government is not to provide
services in a market-like manner. If it were, presumably, it would then
have left the provision of police and fire protection, street maintenance,
refuse collection and other services to private enterprise. Instead, the
city evidently concluded that the market mechanism would be inadequate to
satisfy societal and individual needs and, therefore, undertook to satisfy
these needs itself. If citizens paid individually for police and fire
protection, for example, only the wealthier neighborhoods would be
protected from crime and fire, and the city as a whole would face increased
danger to life and property. Another argument is that a municipality has
an obligation to provide at least the more important municipal services
to residents without regard to their abilities to pay.23 If a city
distributes municipal services according to the taxes-paid standard, it is
in reality distributing these services according to whatever standard it
uses to assess taxes. But taxes are assessed according to wealth, income
or the amount of goods purchased, and these standards, like race, color,
creed and national origin, are not acceptable as a basis for the
distribution of municipal services.
Still another reason which might be offered by a local government
to justify the existence of unequal treatment is that services should
-22-
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be distributed according to property values. For some services, such as
refuse collection, street paving and repair, the provision of
recreational space and others, this standard would not apply because the
provision of these directlyaffects people and not property. However,
for other services, such as police and fire protection, this standard
may be appropriate because among the objectives of these services is the
protection of property. Reasonably, it might be argued that higher
property values demand proportionally more protection. But the loss of
property could be measured in other terms than dollars. It could be
measured, as well, in terms of the effects upon the people who suffer
the loss, and these might be greater for the poor than for the rich
if the same absolute value of property were lost. This argument, however,
would be iather difficult to apply.
There are other arguments which might be presented by a city
in defense of its actions, but the discussion now turns to the standards
and arguments which an advocate of more equal treatment might attempt to
apply.
One such standard is embodied in the notion that municipal
governments should try to meet the needs of all residents equally, if
not fully. Under the "needs" standard, if it could be shown that the
needs of different residents are identical for some services, then
equitable treatment would dictate equal service levels. This, in
Shaw, Mississippi, for example, it is doubtful that the city could
argue successfully that the needs of the poor blacks for streetlights,
sidewalks, sewers and other local improvements were any different than
-23-
those of whites, and thus, under this standard, the city would be
required to provide equal services. However, in the cases of other
services, the needs of different residents often vary considerably
with sociocultural and economic conditions of their neighborhoods. A
study by Benson and Lund (see Appendix A) documents clearly that the
poor have greater needs for sanitation related services, remedial and
health services, and police protection. Similarly, the more affluent
exhibit greater preferences for other services, such as libraries,
supervised recreation and other "developmental services," as
evidenced by their greater participation in the use of these services.
Accordingly, the government should try to satisfy all needs and
preferences to an equal degree.
Clearly, there are monumental difficulties in applying such a
scheme. one difficulty is that it requires the determination of
"needs." In the cases where it is argued that the needs of residents
are identical, there may be little problem; but in the cases where
needs are variable, as for refuse collection, the task of defining
needs and determining the level of service needed is ambiguous at
best. In theory, the determination of the level of service needed in
an area might be made by examining the varying severity of the
consequences and negative effects which would result from different
levels of service. Thus, for example, the minimum level of service
needed for refuse collection could be determined by the maximum level
of negative consequences acceptable or tolerable by the municipality
as a whole. The negative consequences, in this case, might be varying
-24-
degrees of accumulation of garbage and its duration, the breeding of rats
and the spread of disease. It is further suggested that this maximum
tolerable level of negative consequences should be subjected to a
consistent and municipal-wide standard. Actually, service needs of
residents appear to be determined in the "real world" in much the same
way, with one exception--the standard seems to vary with different
neighborhoods and is often set by a political rather than a rational
process.
Here, the problems of determining service needs for certain
areas of a town are, presumably, much like the problems of determining
the nutritional needs for a family of four. In the latter case, after
much study of the consequences of various degrees of malnutrition, a
"minimum standard" was announced for nutritional needs. Implied by this
standard was the notion that the nation could not tolerate, in these
times of food surplus, the consequences and suffering borne by those
who could not afford to eat properly.
Similarly, it is suggested that municipal service needs can be
measured against a municipal-wide "minimum standard" for environmental
quality. Thus, the level of service needed for pest control might be
determined by the tolerable standard for rat bites per thousand children,
for police protection--by crime rates, for sewer provision and maintenance
--by storm flooding and water-borne disease, for street surfacing and
repair--by mud and potholes, and so on.
The question remaining is how is this minimum standard defined?
For the purposes of measuring disparities, this standard can be considered
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as having been already defined by the municipal government. The.minimum
standard is simply that standard applied to the "best" neighborhoods
as indicated by the service levels provided to that area. If this
standard appears to be excessively high for the municipality at large,
then perhaps municipal officials should re-evaluate the "needs" of
these areas.
The essence of this scheme for determining service needs simply
suggests that all residents are entitled to reasonable municipal effort
to provide equal environmental quality. One weakness of this approach,
besides the practical difficulties of implementing it, is that it
assumes wrongly that the municipality is entirely responsible for the
environmental conditions in a neighborhood. Certainly, in some cases,
the residents themselves are more responsible for the cleanliness of a
street than is the municipal street sweeper. Another weakness of
this scheme is that it assumes wrongly that a municipality could
equalize the environment if it so desired. Clearly, it is feasibly
impossible, for example, to reduce crime rates in ghetto areas to the
levels of those in suburban districts. Nevertheless, in cases
where gross disparities exist, it might be argued successfully in a
court of law that a municipality is not doing enough to equalize the
environment, presuming, of course, that the court accepts the equal
environment premise.
In view of the somewhat tenuous arguments in the above scheme for
determining a standard by which services should be distributed, another
standard is proposed. Rather than focussing upon the "outputs" of a
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service, as measured by the, pertinent environmental quality variables,
it is suggested that a standard which focusses upon "inputs" might be
equally beneficial to the disadvantaged and more feasible to implement.
Thus, one might wish -to argue that "equal inputs Per capita, " the
"pro-rata" standard, is an appropriate means by which to measure equity.
This standard is simply an articulation -of an apparently legitimate
governmental goal: the city desires, legitimately, to give each citizen
an "equal share" of municipal services; it does so, rationally, by
applying the principle of per canita distribution. In most instances,
excepting those which concern services provided in response to varying
needs, the disadvantaged would do well to achieve equal inputs. Even
so, however, the use of inputs (most commonly expressed in terms of
per capita expenditures) as measures of outputs is vulnerable to
several criticisms, and these are briefly enumerated below.
The assumption that inputs are suitable measures for outputs is
based upon the following premise: that the outputs of a service can be
thought ofas products of a consistent production-delivery system such
that when equal amounts of resources are input into this system, it
behaves uniformly to produce equal outputs. If this premise is valid
for the service in question, then inputs are presumed valid indicators.
Unfortunately, this premise is often invalid and the use of per capita
expenditure data should be approached with caution.
One weakness of per capita expenditure data is that it leaves the
quality variables uncontrolled. Per capita expenditures for a service
are calculated using the total expenditure spent on one area over a given
-27-
time period and the total population of that area. However, total
expenditure figures disguise differences in the quality of the service.
A local government may spend the same amount of money to provide the
same service to two areas with the same number of. people and achieve an
"outstanding" quality rating by some objective standard in one area
but a "poor" quality rating by the same standard in the other area.
This weakness in the use of inputs was very well illustrated by Ridley
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and Simon in the following quip:
Suppose someone said to you, "I'm a very good shopper.
I spend only five dollars today." Your reply would
be, "That's all very well and good, but what did you
get for the five dollars?"
Thus, the use of per capita expenditure data, by neglecting quality
considerations, could yield incomplete, inaccurate and misleading data
about the true level of service provided to an area.
Another weakness is that often aggregate expenditures are used
rather than expenditures for each particular functional service.
obviously, the use of aggregate expenditures, besides suffering from the
malady mentioned above, obscures the relationship between a specific
service and the population.
A third weakness is that per capita expenditure data ignores the
effects of variations in population densities between two areas. Studies
indicate that the cost per unit of output of municipal services rises
25
with increases in population and land use densities. This then implies
that even though per capita expenditures for two areas may be equal, one
area could be greatly underserviced in comparison with the other if it
were denser. Despite these weaknesses, however, the "pro rata" input
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standard has three advantages: it is easier to implement than the
"needs" standard, in most cases it would improve the condition-of the
impoverished if it was applied, and it is an acceptable standard in
the courts of law.
In summary, this chapter began with the documentation of several
cases of apparent disparities in the distribution of municipal services.
As a sampling, these cases suggested that the scope of the problem is
widespread, with disparities occurring in large cities and small towns,
and that the magnitudes of some disparities can be devastatingly large.
In the debate over the question of what is equitable, two philosophical
approaches to the problem of disparities emerged. One suggested
that an agreement upon the meaning of equity was irrelevant to the real
problem, and that efforts should be focussed on other strategies; the
second embodied the hope that the distributive process could be subjected
to the rule of law. In theory, current constitutional principles seem
to support both the "needs" standard and the "pro rata" input standard
as appropriate measures of equity; but in practice, except in the most
extreme cases, these appear to be difficult to apply and relatively
ineffective. Thus, perhaps other strategies offer more hope. Before one
can talk sensibly about other strategies, however, one must first
understand the nature of the process which distributes municipal services.
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III. CONCEPTUALIZATION OF THE DISTRIBUTIVE PROCESS
This chapter discusses the nature of the "process" which determines
how municipal services are distributed among the various residents of a
municipality and attempts to conceptualize and model the important
elements of this process and their interactions in a general but explicit
way. The purposes in doing so are fourfold: (1) to provide insights and
understanding into the distributive process, (2) to reasonably explain
why disparities exist, (3) to lend support to the general hypothesis that
poor services fall largely upon two distinct segments of the population:
the powerless and the poor, and (4) to contribute to the formulation of
strategies which may help to achieve more equitable distributions.
When attempting to define the "process" which determines how
municipal services are distributed, the assumption that a single process
even exists is, -indeed, presumptuous, not to mention the assumption that
it is capable of being defined. In truth, each municipal service,
ranging from such necessities as water supply and fire protection to the
amenities of tree planting and open space, is allocated and provided in a
different manner and the various factors influencing the distributive
process for each service are likewise different. Moreover, the patterns
of distribution for each service vary with each city and town that one
examines, and each pattern depends upon numerous and often unique
variables ranging from the levels of municipal policies to those of
personal relationships. This diversity and complexity inherent in the
way in which services are distributed does not lend itself easily to
generalities or to conceptual izat ion.
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Thus it is important to recognize that a general model, although
perhaps useful in understanding the broader issues and in answering some
of the questions posed in this study, compromises fine resolution and
some accuracy. While the conceptualization may seem credible and
insightful when one is subconsciously thinking "municipal services," it
may seem somewhat strained in places if one tries to superimpose it upon
one municipal service in particular. Bearing this in mind, the
discussion turns first to an overview and later to several more detailed
analyses of the distributive process.
A. AN OVERVIEW OF THE DISTRIBUTIVE PROCESS
The conceptualization begins at an elementary level by envisioning
in one large set all the municipal services for which a municipal
government has chosen to be responsible. The policy-level decisions of
whether or not to provide a particular service and, if so, at what level
of funding, bear directly upon the question of distribution. They not
only determine which needs shall be met and by how much, but' also
dictate the climate in which all other variables in the distributive
process will operate. As such, it is insightful to mention some of the
reasons why a local government might want to provide a service in the
first place and some of the considerations which bear upon the question
of funding.
Most commonly, a municipal service is provided by local government
because there is an important need for it or substantial numbers of
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residents want it, but it cannot be obtained by other means. The public
sector provides a service because the private sector does not. The
reasons for this phenomenum are several: a service may be unprofitable;
it may not be amenable to service charging because of the problems with
pricing, administrating and bill collecting; or it may be undesirable
to provide services in an environment of profit maximization when the
goal should be to maximize the public welfare; lastly, it may be
societally inefficient. Private competition in the provision of some
municipal services, especially the utilities, would require duplications
of large capital investments and could inhibit the exploitation of
economies of scale. Thus, economic considerations dictate the need for
public or publicly regulated monopolies.
Although there may be several reasons why local government should
provide a service, there are other considerations which weigh in the
decision processes and among the most important of these concern
financing. This discussion does not intend to elaborate here upon the
intricacies of public finance but wishes only to make one point relating
fiscal pressure and the costs of municipal services to the distribution
of municipal services. Today these issues are becoming more and more the
determining factors in the decisions of what services to provide and at
what levels. In the face of skyrocketing costs, increasing demands for
more and better services, rising expectations amid a growing population
and lagging resources, municipal governments are finding not only that
they cannot afford new or expanded services but that they must in fact
reduce the service levels which they are now providing. If one accepts
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as valid the hypothesis that inadequate services fall largely upon the
powerless in society, then the implications of such actions are
unfortunate. Reductions in service levels would fall in greater
proportions upon those least able to resist them, and disparities would
be perpetuated to an even greater extreme. Although it is inaccurate to
say that the disadvantaged are necessarily better off in times of less
fiscal pressure, it is fair to say that strategies which aim towards the
relief of fiscal pressure can have much impact upon the distribution of
municipal services if used in conjunction with others which aim towards
empowering the powerless. Having introduced this point, the
conceptualization of the distributive process continues.
All municipal services for which a municipality has chosen to be
responsible can be categorized in two ways: those which are amenable to
service charging and those which are not. Although it is readily
admitted that nearly every municipal service may be capable of some kind
of direct assessment scheme which then can be imposed upon the
recipients of service benefits, many are not necessarily amenable to
service charging. To illustrate this distinction some examples are
provided.
Public utilities are perhaps the best examples of municipal services
which are both capable of and amenable to service charging. Benefit
spillovers are minimal, that is, benefits are distinctly conferred upon
subscribers; the "basic output unit" is easily quantifiable and capable
of pricing; the degree of administrative sophistication which is
required to operate and manage such services is considerable but
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entirely feasible; and the problems of metering, bill collecting and
enforcement are relatively easy to overcome. Services such as refuse
collection, sewer facilities and those commonly referred to as "local
improvements" (street lighting, sidewalks and curbing, street surfacing
and repair, street cleaning and others) are examples which are capable
of but somewhat less amenable to service charging. Benefits are not
distinctly conferred upon individuals but to all who may live in the
area and to those who pass through. Although the basic output unit
may be easily identifiable, it is somewhat difficult to price, and bill
collection and enforcement problems are complicated. Nevertheless,
many of these services are provided with service charges affixed,
depending upon municipal policies. Police and fire protection services
may be capable of service charging (witness the Pinkertons, Brinks
guards and others), but are not amenable to such a practice nor would it
be desirable for them to be. The benefits of police protection, for
example, are perceived societally rather than individually, and the basic
output unit is confused by the multiple objectives of having a police
force. Lastly, it would be foolish to endanger all citizens by allowing
crime to thrive or fires to roar in the areas and homes of non-subscribers.
Thus, for a number of reasons, services may be categorized as amenable
to service charging or not.
of those that are, municinal policies on service charging determine
whether or not a charge will in fact be placed upon a service. Rather
than speculating in a few short paragraphs on how certain policies have
come about or why they vary so greatly from city to city, the discussion
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wishes only to again point out the potential significance of fiscal
pressure on the distributive process as it bears here upon the policies
which determine whether or not a service will be provided "free-of-
charge" or for a fee.
Today most urban areas do not directly assess residents for such
services as refuse collection, sewer provision, street lights, sidewalks
and many others. Nevertheless, service charging for these is indeed
feasible as evidenced by the experiences of cities and towns across the
country. Admittedly, this practice is more prevalent in the rural and
suburban municipalities where low densities allow easy identification of
the principal benefactors of the service and where initial per capita
outlays of capital are much higher than in the more densely populated
areas. But there are also cases where service charging for refuse
collection and sewer services is the practice in dense urban areas.
26Atlanta, Oakland, Seattle, Rochester and Houston are examples.
In light of these, the following arguments emerge. EconomistJ 7
(Dick Netzer, Wilbur Thompson, and Samuel Wright, to name a few) and
engineers 28 have all argued that the property tax is obsolete as a
means of financing such services, and that service charging could
provide financially burdened governments with new and significant sources
of revenue. Fueling this argument, furthermore, is the fact that the
costs of municipal services in general loom ominously in the background
of public finance, and these in particular contribute significantly to
the overall costs.
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Nationally, fully one-third of all municipal expenditure is spent on
municipal services. From the 1970 Municipal Yearbook, total expenditures
amounted to more than 27 billion dollars (fiscal year 1967-1968) of which
12.6 billion or 47 percent were spent in the categories shown in Table 1
From the U. S. Bureau of the Census for fiscal year 1964-1965 per capita
expenditure data reveals that 32 percent of urban budgets were spent in
those categories shown in Table 2. Lastly, a detailed enumeration of
expenditures in Cambridge in 1970 revealed that 35 percent was spent on
municipal services listed in Table 3. In the ten years between 1960
and 1970 local public works departments' budgets have increased
29
nationally at the rate of 9 percent a year, and these departments
provide most of those services which are amenable to service charging
but which are usually provided free-of-charge.
Atthough it is difficult to say how much fiscal relief might be
achieved by charging for services, it is fair to say that the argument is
tempting to municipal officials. But to achieve fiscal relief by
shifting service charging policies in this case would be unfortunate for
the poor. The lower classes may now enjoy some redistributive benefits
of the general tax, however slight they may be, through the provision of
free sanitation and local improvement services. Strategies aimed at
achieving a more equitable distribution under such circumstances might
increment these benefits even more. But if in the future these services
are provided for a fee, the poor would either have to pay out a larger
percentage of their incomes for them or be denied them economically.
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Table 1 30
National Summary of Municipal Expenditure for 1967-1968
Category Expenditure
(and percentage of total (in millions of
expenditure) dollars)
Education (12.7) 3,405
Public Welfare (6.5) 1,739
Health and Hospitals (5.7) 1,541
Municipal Services (46.5):
Police Protection (8.4) 2,261
Fire Protection (5.2) 1,400
Highways (7.9) 2,142
Sanitation (7.6) 2,051
Parks and Recreation (3.8) 1,003
Water Supply (7.1) 1,928
Gas Supply (0.8) - 212
Electric Power (5.8) 1, 571
Interest on General Debt (3.0) 817
General Control (2.2) 592
Other Direct Expenditure 6,345
TOTAL 27,007
Table 2
Per Capita Expenditures of All Local Governments
in the Thirty-eight Largest SiSA's, 1964-196531
Category
(and percentage of total
expenditure)
Education (37.0)
Public Welfare (7.5)
Health and Hospitals (5.4)
Municipal Services (32.0):
Police Protection (5.2)
Fire Protection (2.9)
Highways (5.9)
Sanitation (4.9)
Parks and Recreation (2.7)
Water Supply (4.6)
Other Utilities (5.7)
Interest on General Debt (3.4)
General Control (2.2)
Other Direct Expenditure
TOTAL_
Per Capita
Expenditure
(dollars)
123.65
25.13
18.17
17.27
9.87
19.85
16.54
9.04
15.34
19.22
11,54
7.27-
42.87
335.76
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Table 3
City Expenditure for Municipal Services in Cambridge, 1970
(Total city expenditure was $42,254,867)32
Category Expenditure
Public Works Operations
Snow clearing, street sweeping, sewer
and catch basin cleaning, park maintenance,
pest control, cemetary operation, street
paving and renairs, signing, equipment
and vehicle maintenance and solid, waste
system operation (80-90% of these costs
are for collection)
Building and Housing Inspection
Electrical Inspection
Street Lighting and Traffic Signals
(Electricity)
Traffic and Parking
Recreation--Golf
Recreation--Playgrounds
Police Protection (including Civil Defense)
Fire Protection
Street Construction
Gypsy Moth and Dutch Elm
Dog Officer
Capital Improvements Program
Urban Beautification--1970
Tennis Court Program
Planting Program
Traffic Signals (Cost and Installation)
Police Vehicle Replacement
Lexington Avenue Fire Station
Public Works Coordination Study
Central Square Parking Garage
Capital Improvements Revolving Fund
Water Department
Total Expenditure for Municipal Services
Non Contributory Pensions directly
attributed to the above categories
TOTAL
3,399,435
121,843
271,187
422,873
428,960
50,925
547,569
2,902,802
3,416,333
42,150
7,500
9,570
220,000
6,000
10,000
107,000
25,000
2,000
35,000
30,000
45,000
1,816,078
13,917,255
1,023,409
14,940,664
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Once again it is pointed out that. fiscal pressure and the costs of
services bear upon the distributive process, as in this case by means
of municipal policies on service charging.
As noted above, municipal services are now conceptualized as being
divided into two more categories: those which are provided free-of-
charge and those which are not. . This distinction in the way services
are to be rendered is obviously important to the question of how services
are distributed. In the case where services are provided out of general
revenues, the pattern of distribution is largely influenced by the
discretion of municipal officials, administrators and supervisors, but
in the latter case the pattern of distribution is more influenced by the
willingness and ability of each resident to purchase them. Also, there
are legal and ethical differences which should be recognized. Free
services may be considered to be entitlements of all residents regardless
of social or economic status, but purchased services may be considered to
be privileges for only those able to pay for them.
Thus, to complete the overview, municipal services in each of these
two categories enter a distributive process, or with the reader's
permission, sub-processes peculiar to the philosophy in which they are
rendered. From these sub-processes, then, the quantitative and
qualitative levels of services are distributed among the various residents
or residential areas. This is to say, more simply, that following this
overview a more detailed analysis of the ways in which both "free" and
"charged" services are distributed will be presented, and that each type
will.be addressed separately.
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At this point Figure 1 is presented as the first of nine. The
purposes of these schematic diagrams are several. First, they are used
both to summarize and to clarify the points made in the text. Second,
they provide at a glance the various conceptualizations and their
interrelationships which have been made elsewhere. But more importantly,
they are the results of an experiment in understanding. From the
beginning of this research, the "process" which distributed municipal
services seemed to be studded with confusing and circular interactions
and to be influenced throughout by forces which seemed to hold a certain
distributive pattern in a state of "equilibrium." The level of service
actually provided to an area, for example, seemed to be a function of the
level of service tolerated by the residents in the area. But this was in
turn a function of past service levels. But cases of increased resident
pressure were inconclusive--sometimes this worked and other times it
did not. Political pressure was shown to be a positive force in some
cases for obtaining better services, but a depressing force in others if
improved services started an immigration of more affluent residents due
to the increased intra-city attractiveness. Strategies toward equitable
distribution, if applied singularly, seemed to hold out little hope, for
the forces which had created unequal distributions could then manifest
themselves in other ways which could neutralize any gains. Some
indications showed that if strategies did in fact succeed, it was to the
injury of those who were the focus of concern.
Because it was confusing to recall many general observations
simultaneously and to try to interpret them in continually changing light
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Figure 1: An Overview of the General Distributive Process
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it was felt that a more explicit model of the essence of each would be
useful. Heavily influenced by the various applications of "systems
34dynamics" and by the works of Jay Forrester, these schematic diagrams.
are an attempt to explicate the variables and their interrelationships
with the hope of better estimating the second and third order effects of
particular combinations of relief strategies. Whether or not this effort
has been of value is somewhat debatable and is left for the reader to
decide.
Figure 1, then, simply represents the overview presented so far.
In this figure, all those services for which a municipality has chosen
to be responsible are, first,categorized as to whether or not they are
amenable to service charging. Those which are not are, of course,
rendered to the public free-of-charge. Of those which are, however,
municipal policy determines whether they will be provided free-of-charge
or "sold" for a fee. From here each set of services enter their
respective distributive processes, or sub-processes, from which they fall
upon both residents and residential areas depending upon the nature of
each particular service. The numbers in parentheses in Figure 1 serve
as a means of cross-referencing, and are the figure numbers of other
diagrams where the referenced item is again displayed.
The existence of disparity in the distribution of municipal services,
if one will recall the discussion in the previous chapter, depends more
precisely upon the level of service provided rather than upon the
quantitative amount of service provided. Two areas may receive the same
amount of service, for example, and in one the service may be excellent
but in the other, poor. Recognizing the importance, then, of both the
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quantitative and qualitative facets of the level of service variable, a
general scheme illustrating this is shown in Figure 2. The allocation of
service quantities and the control of service quality are modelled
separately to reflect the fact that different factors may affect each.
For example, municipal officials may have considerable control over the
allocation of service quantities, but may have little power to effect the
actual quality of service. Oppositely, municipal employees directly
effect the quality of service, which often varies with different
35
neighborhoods, but may have little control over the actual allocation
of service quantities.
The valve symbols inside the broke rectangular outline, as shown
in the figure, are used to represent control over the flow of quantity
and quality to the different areas and to distinguish these variables
from others in subsequent figures. The flattened ellipse represents a
recipient individual or residential area, and inside it are two solid
rectangular.elements representing the cuantitative and qualitative
levels of service Provided to the recipient. Summarizing, these two
initial figures simply provide the basic structure upon which is hung
the essence of the process which determines how municipal services are
distributed.
Bearing in mind the perspective provided in this overview, the
next section focusses more narrowly upon municipal services provided
free-of-charge.
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B. MUNICIPAL SERVICES RENDERED FREE-OF-CHARGE
At the most general level, the distributive process for those
municipal services which are financed out of general revenue and which
are rendered to the public free-of-charge is conceptualized as being
principally influenced by three broadly categorized variables. One is
the use of discretion by municipal officials, administrators, and
.k~
supervisors in the daily performance of their duties and responsibilities;
another includes the various effects and influences of the public
employee, organized or otherwise, as he manifests his own attitudes and
self-interests, and as he plays an expanding role in the making of
policy and its implementation; and a third includes a host of other
factors lumped together under the term "exogenous inputs."
This third category contains such factors as the costs of providing
services, overall budget constraints, municipal guidelines for the
allocation of services, legal mandates outlining municipal
responsibilities, the kind of organizational structure of the local
government and others. They are labelled "exogenous" in this study
because they are condidered as the overall constraints within which the
other variables of the distributive process are free to operate.
The fact that these are exogenous inputs should in no way detract
from their importance. Service costs and budget constraints, for example,
are critically important to the determination of the levels of resources
which are available for allocation, and these weigh heavily in the
decisions of who gets what and how much. Different kinds of
-45-
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organizational structures of governments may either allow considerable
freedom in the use of administrative discretion or subject decision
making processes to tightly controlled procedures and municinal
guidelines. Furthermore, the fact that these inputs are exogenous in
no way means that they are incapable of changing with time. Costs may
increase, budgets may be reduced, the political climate may change,
affecting the degree of centralized control, legal mandates may order
different allocative procedures and other changes can be envisioned.
But for the purposes of analysis these factors are considered at any
one point in time as the "givens" of a specific situation.
Some of these are enumerated in Figure 3 and are shown schematically
to principally influence the allocation of service quantities. As a
point in notation in this figure, the broken lines appearing with
arrowheads are used to represent an influence or an effect upon one
element or variable in the scheme arising from another. Variables in
the figure which are faced by square corners do not appear in other
figures, while those which are faced by curved lines do and are
modelled in greater detail. Again, the numbers in parentheses cross-
reference other figures. Although the exogenous inputs may significantly
affect only the quantitative allocation of services, administrative
discretion (the phrase is used here in its broadest sense, meaning the
discretion of personnel at all levels of administration, supervision
and management) and the effects of public employees significantly
affect both the allocation of service quantities and the control over
service quality.
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Figure 3: Variables Influencing the Distributive Sub-process for
Municipal Services Rendered Free-of-charge
-47-
(
Sa)
b)
c)
d)
e)
f)
g)
II
I
/
/
---- k" -. , -.- 1. .__ ' - - - - --- _ - -..- -, ,, , .' - "' g "i --. I- -- .
Administrative Discretion
Evidence indicates that administrative discretion, sr it affects
the distributive process, is a major, if not the most sigaificant,
variable in the creation and perpetuation of disparities. Although it
affects the actual allocation of service quantities most directly, it
significantly influences the distribution of service quality as well.
The evidence supporting these claims is drawn from four principal
sources: the author's participation in a ten-week summer study of
municipal service systems in Cambridge, Massachusetts, Gordan's 36
research of refuse collection and street cleaning services in Boston,
the publications of related research efforts in the field of public
services, and legal literature regarding disparities in the distribution
of municipal services.
Of these, the foremost is the author's Cambridge experience. This
study was undertaken in the summer of 1970 and its objective was to
gain insights into the operation of several specific municipal services
with the hope that'some facets of recent research and technological
innovations might be applied to these operations. A large portion of
the work during this period was spent interviewing supervisors,
managers, administrators, and other municipal officials, and learning
and occasionally participating in daily operations. The concluding
37
report, Cambridge Municipal Services Study, 1970, failed, somewhat,
in outlining technological innovations, but the focus of the study
had long since shifted. What was far more intriguing was the nature
of local government, the interrelationships between agencies and between
-48-
personnel, the politics of patronage and of the provision of service,
the visceral decisions of municipal officials, and the ways in which
assignments were actually accomplished or slowly undermined. Throughout
the report appears a wealth of information and insights about the
workings of one specific, and perhaps typical, local government, and
especially about the ill-defined process by which municipal services
are allocated among the competing residents and residential areas of
Cambridge. Although the following model of the factors influencing
administrative discretion purports "generality," the author's reliance
upon this experience unavoidably has given it a distinctly Cambridge
coloring. Nevertheless, information from other sources indicates that
these insights are applicable in varying degrees to other municipalities
as well.
One insight concerned the nearly limitless reign of administrative
discretion in the Cambridge Department of Public Works (DPW). DPW is
responsible for many of the municipal services provided by the city
including refuse collection, street cleaning, snow clearing, sewer
and catch basin cleaning, and others. The sound exercise of
administrative discretion is, of course, unobjectionable in itself,
especially when it has a rational basis and is reasonably objective in
the allocation of services. Ideally, though, the amount of decision
making left solely to the discretion of authorities should be curtailed
whenever possible, and replaced by more analytic and explicit methods.
The tools of systems analysis, information systems and Planning,
Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) are examples of some of the
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recent developments toward administrative sophistication which. would
greatly Improve the efficacy of municipal service systems. All the
available literature suggests, however, that municipal agencies (with
the exception of some in New York City) rarely find themselves in the
vanguard of administrative innovation. Those in Cambridge are typical
at best. Furthermore, the operational organization of the Cambridge
Administration, although appearing in theory to be centralized beneath
the city manager, was in reality fairly decentralized under City
Manager John Corcoran,with each department running its own show.
Thus, in the void of sophisticated analytic and methodological techniques,
and with loose administrative control, middle level officials were
allowed a maximum of freedom in exercising their best judgements.
When discretion is exercised, hopefully it relies upon factual
information. In Cambridge, there is an ubiquitous dearth of factual
information. The only records which were maintained in the offices of
DPW were personnel records: salaries, wages, overtime, sick leave,
vacation leave and other data. Nowhere could it be determined where a
service had been provided, when or at what frequency or how much had
been provided. There was no routing plan for street sweeping, and the
streets which were cleaned were apparently chosen in an arbitrary way.
Don Zollo and Larry Frazier of the Environmental and Municipal Services
Component of Cambridge Model Cities agreed that "some streets [in the
Model Neighborhood Area] had never been swept."
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Poor management of DPW is one reason for the poor service and the
lack of information. Of the three sweepers that DPW had, never during
the ten weeks of study was there more than one operable, and the
odometer, which might have yielded clues as to its use, was broken.
There was no weighing of refuse collection vehicles, even after City
Manager Corcoran had requested this on our behalf. There was no recent
cost data except'at the hopelessly aggregated level of the Annual Budget.
This dearth of information can be partially attributed to the f act that
nearly all of the personnel in administrative or supervisory positions
have risen up through the ranks, and as such, most are unaccustomed to
"paperwork" and don't see the need for data. Commissioner Ralph Dunphy,
for example, seemed to spend little time in his office and, by his own
admission, spends most of his day in his radio-equipped car inspecting
daily operations. Nevertheless, one can hardly overlook another
possible reason for this lack of data--the convenient and virtual
invulnerability to challenges of inefficiency when no one knows what is.
going on.
This expose is provided only to underscore the fact that
administrative discretion, at least in Cambridge, often has no rational
or factual basis whatsoever. Instead, nearly all decisions in DPW are
heavily reliant upon intuitive models of operations, scheduling and
allocation of service, and these are built largely upon experience,
maxims and folklore which have accumulated over the years in spite of
evidence that some portion might be incorrect. In this vacuum of
information, administrative discretion is not only allowed exorbitant
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freedom, but is dangerously unchallengeable. In recognition of this
point, the use of administrative discretion is conceptually modelled to
respond to the different effects of varying degrees of respect for or
reliance upon factual data, record keeping, systematic and periodic
scheduling of services and inspection of serviced areas, modern
management techniques, intuitive models of operations and allocation of
services, past experiences, folklore and other factors.
Another insight into the way in which administrative discretion
affects the distribution of municinal services, was that administrators
must first perceive the needs for services before services are ever
allocated. Because there is no systematic and thorough inspection of
such things as sewers and streets nor any periodic scheduling of
preventive maintenance, services are often provided only in response to
complaints by residents who take it upon themselves to report the need
for service. Thus, needs for service are often never perceived by
municipal officials unless they are clearly and loudly articulated. In
Cambridge, for example, it was observed that the daily job assignments
for many of the DPW employees in the "labor pool" were drawn from a
list of complaints from residents compiled the day before. To obtain
service a resident had to phone in a request for it.
Officials in Boston's Public Works Department (PWD) readily admit
the importance of the complaint. Not only does it allow administrators
to perceive needs for services but it is often considered as a valid
indicator of service adequacy. In the 1964 Annual Report of the Boston
Public Works Department is the following statement: Under discussion is
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a particular type of refuse removal operation "which has proven
satisfactory as evidenced by the absence of complaints from this
district." Although most complaints are received by phone, officials
say the most effective complaint is one that is written.
It is a well observed phenomenum that local governinents tend to
provide no better service than the minimum amount tolerable by the
residents of an area. In a voluminous report of public services in
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Perry Hilltop (near Pittsburgh), Pennsylvania, for example, is the
following note: in the face of insufficient operating and capital
funds, "the local government follows the minimum standards which the
public will accept without political revolt," and then continues to cite
resident apathy as a major reason for poor service. The Cambridge
study and Gordan's of Boston similarly noted that the level of service
provided was often a reflection of the level of service demanded. In
Gordan's interviews with refuse collection contractors, one replied to
a question concerning the difficulties of different districts: "West
Roxbury is the toughest district. They demand the best service. If we
didn't do a good job, West Roxbury is the place you'd hear from first."
Lastly, at the risk of belaboring the point, in another interview she
recorded the comment: "As the class of people go down, service
requirements go down." Clearly, articulated demands and complaints affect
both administrators' perceptions of the service needs of different areas
and the way in which they allocate services and control quality.
Complaints and the threat of action are not the only weapons
available to residents who are battling for better service. Residents
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can often exert more direct pressure upon administrators and may,
themselves, have "influence at City Hall." The residents of Beacon
Hill, for example, have organized themselves and are represented by
the Beacon Hill Neighborhood Association. Apparently BHNA exerts
significant influence upon the Boston PWD through "their representative,"
and it is no accident that Beacon Hill gets street cleaning twice a week
when all others receive this service only once a.week in Boston, 3 9 and
that Beacon Hill gets refuse collection services three times a week in
all seasons of the year while other areas in the city, equally
densely populated, receive it only once or twice a week depending, in
most cases, upon the season (refer to Table 4 ). Boston authorities
admit themselves that they resnond rapidly to the request of or
complaints from BHNA. Influential residents can easily obtain
preferential treatment for their own neighborhoods. Gordan observed
the feeling among some collection crews that the worst areas to work
in were "where the politicians live." 40 In an exclusive stretch of
New York City's Park Avenue a bustlinq rat colony had suddenly been
41discovered and Health Department exterminators quickly appeared, yet in
the slums of the city millions of rats thrive under municipal
indifference. Is not a rat a rat? It appears, then, that pressure
from influential residents or residential association can and does
bear upon the decision processes which determine who gets what, how
much and of what quality.
Political pressure is yet another factor weighing upon.
administrators' "best judgements." The fact that Mayor Vellucci of
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Table 4
Refuse Collection: Collections Per Week
Garbage
Boston
Dstit Location Rubbish 9/1 6/1Distr2.ctto 
oto t
5/31 8/31
1A Charlestown 1 1 2
lB Downtown (North 3 3 3
& West End,
Beacon Hill)
1C Uptown 2 2 2
9 East Boston 1
10 Roxbury
2 Jamaica Plain 1 1 2
4 Brighton 1 1 2
6 West Roxbury 1 1 2
8 Hyde Park 1 1 2
3 Dorchester North 1 1 2
5 South Boston 1 1 1
7 Dorchester South 1 1 2
42
Source: Gordan's interviews and PWD Contract
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Cambridge happens to derive the majority of his political support from
the ethnically Italian area of East Cambridge 'and that this neighborhood
is among the "best serviced" in the city is no coincidence. "Best
serviced" is used loosely. The consensus among residents with whom this
author has spoken is that this area does receive better service, but
the only evidence discovered supporting this feeling is the routing of
snow clearance vehicles, and the only reason that these routes are
actually recorded is because they are contracted in the private sector.
Nearly all residential streets in East Cambridge are required by contract
to be plowed, but in other areas such as Cambridgeport, only the
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heavily travelled arteries are designated by this priority. The
phenomenum of political pressure being exerted by elected representatives
on behalf of their constituencies, however, needs little documentation
here.
Of the major categories of factors which affect the exercising of
administrative discretion, one remains to be discussed. Evidence
indicates that many of the large scale disparities in the distribution
of municipal services are simply the results of unarticulated biases
and arbitrariness on the part of officials. Below, two cases are
drawn from the author's experience' in Cambridge, and one from a now
famous legal suit.
In Cambridge, "barrel-rolling" is a popular service among those
who receive it. On the day of refuse collection "barrel-rollers" roll
the garbage and trash barrels from behind one's house to the curb before
pick-up. In 1965 this service was estimated by John Corcoran, now City
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Manager of Cambridge, to cost $206,000 annually, nearly one-third of
total collection costs. Commissioner Dunphy estimated that 35 percent of
Cambridge residents receive this service. Originally this service was
intended to help the elderly and the physically handicapped who, in
the days of wood and coal furnaces when ash barrels were exceptionally
heavy, could not manage this task alone. Today, however, a great portion
of the residents who receive barrel-rolling services do not fit into
this category, evidenced by the incredibly large percentage of the
population which would have to be aged or disabled, if by nothing else.
When the Model Cities staff learned of the service, however, a quick
survey revealed that very few of the residents in the Model Neighborhood
were receiving it, even though many were eligible under the formal
requirements. A short-lived effort on the part of Model Cities to
organize these residents for entitlement was met with a flat refusal by
DPW to provide the service.
A second case again involves the residents of the depressed Model
Neighborhood Area. According to Don Zollo, head of the Municipal and
Environmental Services Component of Model Cities, clogged sewers and
catch basins and the resulting. flooding of streets and sidewalks had
been a problem for several years. Storm water would stand for days in
low areas causing inconvenience and irritation to residents as well as
presenting a health hazard. Allegedly, repeated complaints to DPW had
brought no response, and the catch basins had remained clogged. In
exasperation, he said, Model Cities hired its own equipment to do this
job. Evidenced by the layers of autumn leaves in a basin's sediment,
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many had not been cleaned out in five to nine years. At the same time,
however, DPW had equipment and crews operating in other areas of the
city. Both cases indicate that complaints, requests for services and
even organized residents' pressure, can be met with administrative
discretion characterized by blatant arbitrariness.
Lastly, the biases which administrators may have toward certain
racial, ethnic or socio-economic groups can be another force in the
creation of disnarities. It was this hypothesis, in fact, which Gordan
was testing in her research of Boston. Among administrators, she found
that some were understanding of the plight of the poor, but that others
were of the opinion that the lower classes simply-didn't care about
neighborhood cleanliness. But a recent legal suit on behalf of the
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blacks in the Town of Shaw, Mississippi illustrates more clearly than
any other example the potentially powerful effects of administrators'
biases.
As in many rural southern towns, the residential areas of Shaw were
segregated. Blacks comprise 60 percent of the town's population of
2,500, yet only 3 percent live in homes fronting on paved streets while
99 percent of white homes front on paved streets. Nearly 97 percent of
black homes are not served by sanitary sewers, but only 1 percent of
white homes are not so served. Although the town has acquired a
significant number of medium and high intensity mercury vapor street
lighting, every one has been installed in white neighborhoods. Similar
statistical evidence of grave disparities in both level and kinds of
services offered regarding surface water drainage, water mains, fire
-58-
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hydrants, and traffic control apparatus, is available and undisputed by
municipal officials. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
ruled that these statistics were enough evidence to establish a prima
facie case of racial discrimination.
In summary, administrative discretion appears to be a most
significant variable influencing the distribution of municipal services
rendered free-of-charge. Although it primarily affects the allocation
of service quantities it also exerts control over service quality.
There are, of course, many considerations and forces which shape its use.
The above paragraphs have attempted to broadly categorize them and to
enumerate and document some of them as illustrations. Schematically,
these categorized factors influencing administrative discretion are
displayed in Figure 4, which at this point is hopefully self-explanatory.
Before elaborating how these factors tend to work against certain
segments of the population, the discussion now examines briefly another
variable influencing the distributive process--the effects of public
employees.
Effects of Public Employees
Public employees can directly affect the distribution of municipal
services. Specifically, the unarticulated biases of public employees
toward certain population segments can seriously undermine the quality
of the services being provided and, as such, significant disparities in
the distribution of services can result simply from qualitative differences.
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The fact that these biases can and often do exist needs little
documentation here. Nevertheless, Gordan's interviews with men of the
refuse collection and street cleaning crews brought out some comments
which are worth noting:
Roxbury (a low income and predominately black area)
is the "worst" section because the trash is "all
on the ground." It's a dirtier and sloppier job
and there are "lots of rats." People in Roxbury
"have kids, but don't have proper control over them.
They let them do anything. The class of people is
important. These people never know nothin'. The
front door could be smashed--probably the ol' man
did it--and they never tell. They don't even want
to help themselves." "If you clean in the morning
it's dirty again at night." "As the class of people
go down, service requirements go down."
All these comments suggest the service quality in certain areas is
probably at a minimum level. Gordan notes that although employees deny
that some areas get better service than others, they do admit that it
is harder working in the upper-middle class neighborhoods "because
you know you have to do a good job."
Besides being able to directly affect the distribution of services
qualitatively, with the recent and accelerating trend toward unionization
of public servants, employees are fast gaining the ability to.affect the
quantitative distribution as well. When former mayor of New York City,
Robert Wagner, asked the police to patrol the housing projects, the
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police refused and were supported by the commissioner. Organized and
represented by the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association (PBA), and
entrenched in the protection of the civil service merit system, the
policemen are virtually invulnerable to harsh disciplining. This
example is indicative of effects of unionization upon other services,
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too, as is discussed in an article by Francis Piven, "Militant Civil
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Servants -in New York City."
Furthermore, public employees are beginning to demand the right to
set policies, usually- on the ground that as the people who are actually
performing the jobs, they should know what's best. The PBA has begun
issuing its own instructions to policemen on how the law should be
enforced, to countermand Mayor John Lindsay's presumed indulgence of
looters and demonstrators. Similarly, the PFA opposed, nearly
successfully, the formation of the "fourth platoon" permitting heavier
scheduling of policemen during high crime hours, the formation of
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civilian review boards.
In summary, municipal employees have always had the ability to
affect the quality of services, and are now, by banding together,
beginning to exercise expanding control over public agencies. organized,
they can erode quality of service in certain areas, undermine policies
they don't like, and even declare and implement their own policies. In
short, employees are beginning to assert their attitudes and self-
interests. Unfortunately, as urban populations change in socio-economic
complexion such that larger segments of the "general public" are black
and poor, ethnic and ideological differences between the servants and
the served become sharper, and the various effects arising from these
differences may seriously affect the distribution of municipal services.
It is noted here that as the effects influence services qualitatively,
it makes little difference whether municipal services are rendered free-
of-charge or with service charges affixed. Again these points are
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modelled schematically in Figure 5.
C.. MONICIPAL SERVICES RENDERED.FOR A FEE
Although most municipal services in well-populated areas are
rendered free-of-charge to the public, there are, nevertheless, many
which are not. Recalling a previous enumeration, examples of these are
the utilities or those services which are perhaps best described as
"flow systems": water supply, electric power, gas supply and frequently
sewer services. In a survey conducted by the American Public Works
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Association (IPWA) in 1969, of 454 municipalities reporting, 333 (more
than 73 percent) replied that they levied sewer service charges. This
charge is often based on the amount of water metered ard can be greater
than 100 percent of the water charge, but is usually less. The same
survey revealed that 44 percent of the reporting cities levied service
charges on refuse collection. Other services which are, in some areas,
rendered for a fee are the "local improvements," such as street cleaning,
sidewalk installation and maintenance, street lighting, tree ylantings,
the provision of recreational areas, and even rat and pest control
services.
Although it is difficult to talk generally about all these kinds
of services at once, it seems that one can conceptualize two phases of
the distributive process for all of them: the first concerns the decisions
of where these services are to be made available such that residents may
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purchase them, and then after the services have been made available,
a second phase, resembling a market mechanism, takes over and determines
which residents will actually receive the service because they are
willing to "buy" them and who won't because they are unwilling or unable
to buy them.
In the first phase, there are numerous factors influencing the
decisions of where services are to be "put on the market." In the
older and larger cities, the "necessary" services (utilities, refuse
collection and sewer services) usually already exist.in most areas to
some degree or another. In the smaller and expanding municipalities,
however, decisions must be made as to where these services are to be
authorized and extended. For services which might be better typed by
the word "amenities," regardless of city characteristics these same
decisions of where services will be made available must be made. It
is surmized that they would be based upon reasonable considerations,
cost/benefit studies, anticipated demand and revenue, but in the end
would be made at the discretion of local authorities.
It is precisely at this point where disparities may again occur,
for there is no evidence to indicate that administrative discretion in
this case is any different from that of before. Thus, if litigation,
for example, were successful in mandating equal treatment in the Shaw,
Mississippi case as long as services were provided out of general
revenues, town officials could shift policies, affix service charges,
reduce the tax rate accordingly and claim that the poor and Negro areas
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were risky investments; besides this, these low income families may not
be able to afford the services anyway.
In the second phase, once and if services have been "put on the
market" in an area, the distributive process is conceptualized as
operating much like a regulated monopoly market mechanism. Services are
dispensed in accordance with the .perceived value of the services--a
function of the needs and preferences of different .residents--and with
the abilities of residents to buy the services. Clearly, the ability
to pay is a function of a resident's economic status.
In Lexington Park, Maryland, water and sewer service charges are
computed from a "front foot benefit" fixed charge and a variable rate
charge. If a resident owns 200 feet of front footage, these charges
usually amount to well over a hundred dollars a year, and the author
knows of several cases where poor residents have wanted and inquired
about these services but then said they could not afford them. It is
ironic that the very pipes which may be physically as close as 20 feet,
are in reality so far away. It should be noted here that a strategy
of subsidization would indeed be applicable in these cases.
As mentioned in the previous section, the effects of employees upon
service quality are essentially identical here as for the "free" services.
There is one implication, however, which is different. As service
qualitv goes down, the need for service quantity usually goes up in an
ef fort to compensate the low level of service. This might mean that
the actual cost of adequate service may rise in areas where- employee
biases manifest themselves in poor quality.
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In summary, the distributive process for municipal services rendered
for a fee is conceptualized textually above and schematically in
Figure 6.
D. EXCLUSION OF THE POWERLESS AND THE POOR
The preceding discussions have all tried to identify and document
the principal forces which determine how municipal services are
distributed, and to conceptualize and organize these forces and their
effects in a coherent and explicit model. The discussion in this
section hopes to illustrate that all of these forces, if allowed to
operate freely, tend to work against the disadvantaged members in
society and do so largely because they are powerless and poor.
If the observations of Cambridge, Boston and Shaw are representative
of municipalities in general, then it is reasonable to assume that the
internal workings of local governments are characterized by considerable
freedom in the use of administrative discretion. Furthermore,
unchecked discretion typically operates in an environment of average to
poor management and often relies upon visceral judgements rather than
upon factual information, systematic scheduling or periodic inspections.
Recall that in such an environment the needs of residents for
certain levels of service are often never perceived by municipal
officials unless the residents themselves clearly articulate them. It
was noted, for example, that local governments facing fiscal pressure
tend to provide the minimum level of service tolerable, and that the
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"complaint level" is often used as an indicator of service adequacy.
Unfortunately, this reliance upon resident feedback distorts .the true
needs of different classes of people--the middle and upper classes
articulate readily and effectively, the lower classes don't. The poorly
educated, for example, have little skill in writing letters; the
unsophisticated may be intimidated when speaking to municipal officials
or, for that matter, to the sometimes terse operator at City Hall; the
alienated may not know whom to call, how to complain or that complaining
is worthwhile. In sharp contrast, the middle and upper classes can
easily and confidently articulate their irritations and, as such, enjoy
a distinct advantage over the lower classes.
Moreover, different people react differently to poor or inadequate
service. In terms of the outward signs which are meaningful to
municipal officials and employees alike, the rich tend to tolerate very
little poor service and the poor tend to tolerate much more.
Accordingly, some people receive better service than others.
There are a number of explanations for this apparent difference in
toleration levels. One, as mentioned above, is that the disadvantaged
are less able to express their irritations in terms of the outward signs
whi-ch are meaningful to officials--the written letter, a well articulated
phone call. Another is that the lower classes may be unknowing of their
rights and entitlements to certain services and to service adequacy. In
Cambridge, for example, many do not know that "barrel-rolling" exists
or that DPW picks up bulk refuse when called. A third explanation might
be that the poor are less motivated to try to obtain better service
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through the "proper channels." Gordan noted a consensus in her interviews
with Roxbury residents that complaining was ineffective, "what good
would it do to complain? , They don't care about this place." Adding
validity to this feeling is the observation in Cambridge that complaining
was sometimes effective and other times it was not--and the distinction
seemed related to sociocultural factors. Lastly, there are indeed
differences in the demands and expectations of different people.
The service demands of an individual at any income level are a
function of his cultural experience, his social conditioning to
environmental quality variables and to past levels of service, and
the attitudes and habits of other individuals within his life space.
It makes little sense to complain about an unswept street when garbage
lies in heaps in the alleys and vacant lots. This is not to say that
the low income person is not concerned about poor environmental quality,
but suggests that he may be consigned to it by the state of his condition
and by his powerlessness in general. (Because these points relate
directly to those modelled conceptually in other sections, they are
similarly modelled in Figure 7.)
The positive benefits of political representation need no
elaboration here. Surprisingly, however, there are possible disbenefits.
A politician who understands the needs and preferences of his constituents
will presumably act upon these in a positive manner as long as he
perceives that such actions do not endanger his political base. In an
interview with Justin Gray, past head of the Community Development
Section of the Cambridge government, it was noted, however, that often
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a councilman does indeed perceive that higher service levels in a
neighborhood may be counter-productive. If service levels were
markedly improved. and if a low income area were suddenly showered with
amenities, higher environmental quality may initiate intra-city
migration into this neighborhood. The more affluent who had previously
been repelled, may now be attracted. Their immigration might
precipitate land speculation, increase property valuations, escalate
tax payments and rent levels and drive out the low income residents.
Not only is this forced outmigration injurious to the poor, but also to
the political base of a politician whose ideologies may be quite
different from that of the changing neighborhood. Thus, it is an
odd twist of fate that says depressed service levels may be the price
for neighborhood stability.
It is noted, however, that environmental quality is but one of the
many factors contributing to the attractiveness of an area for intra-city
migration. The quality of primary and secondary education, housing
stock and others are also important. It does seem fair to say, however,
that some tradeoffs must be made if one wishes to preserve low-income
neighborhood stability.
These points are again modelled conceptually in Figures 8 and 9.
Also shown in these figures is the phenomenum documented by Benson and
Lund (see Appendix A) that the needs and preferences of residents are a
function of their sociocultural and economic condition. Furthermore,
the concept developed in Chapter II, that the level of service actually
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provided is a function of both quantitative and qualitative levels, is
shown in Figure 9.
In review, all of.the factors mentioned above and in the previous
sections tend to work against the lower classes in society. Poverty
dictates that they shall be able to afford only very necessary services
which are rendered for a fee. Poverty dictates that the poor may, indeed,
be destined indefinitely to poor service as the price for low property
valuations, low taxes and rent levels. Intra-city migration effects
dictate that the overall attractiveness of a low-income area may be
required to maintain a fixed relative position with respect to other
areas, and that the only hope for better services lies in the improvement
of the attractiveness of all areas, or in the sacrifice of public
education, housing quality and other things. Powerlessness allows
administrative discretion, influenced by many factors (Figure 4) and
the biases of both employees and administrators to operate negatively in
the distributive process and disparities result. Although the
disadvantaged in society may indeed be described as poor, it is felt
that a distinction should be made between poverty and powerlessness.
The example of the better-serviced East Cambridge area illustrates that
some may be poor (1960 Census data shows that incomes in this area
ranged from $3,744 to $5,722) but not powerless.
Thus, as a general conclusion, the distributive process, as
conceptualized in this study, excludes both the powerless and the poor
from an equitable distribution of municipal services.
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IV. STRATEGIES AND IMPLICATIONS
As one reflects upon the model of the distributive process, two
sentiments emerge regarding relief strategies. One is a feeling that
there is much which can be done to help the disadvantaged obtain fair
treatment in the distribution of municipal services. But another is a
feeling of caution and confusion about which strategies will in fact do
more good than harm in the long run.
Although the reasons why disparities exist are fairly clear at
this point, the long range effects of certain relief strategies are
confusing at best. The model in Chapter III indicated, for example,
that if some strategies were successful in achieving their objectives,
the underlying forces which had caused the disparities in the first
place might simply manifest themselves in different and possibly worse
ways. But even if they did not, and these strategies were successful
in equalizing environmental quality, the model again indicated that
this success might endanger neighborhood stability and might force the
poor to relocate outside the area of improvement.
Because of the confusing nature of these interactions and implications
the author invested some effort in constructing a computer model of the
distributive process in the hope of better understanding the long-range
effects of different combinations of strategies. The model, as
conceptualized in Chapter III, was programmed in DYNAMO II for the IBM
360/75 and a listing appears in Appendix B. For simplicity, it
considered only one service, refuse collection, and two residential areas,
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a low-income area and a middle-upper-income area.
Referring occasionally to the conclusions of this model, the
following discussion focusses upon several broad categories of strategies,
considers specific strategies and their limitations and surmizes upon
the implications of their successes. At this point, however, the
ultimate goal of these strategies needs redefining. Originally, the
goal was to achieve "equity in both the quantitative and qualitative.
distributions of municipal services." After much reflection and
after a considerable number of computer runs it slowly became evident
that this goal is an unreal one, that it is practically impossible to
achieve environmental equality among socioculturally and economically
different residential areas. However, it is possible to improve
environmental quality in the disadvantaged areas; but this does not
necessarily imply that disparities shall diminish as a result.
Towards this new goal several general categories of strategies
are envisioned which aim at empowering the powerless, preventing service
charging, improving service quality and raising service levels in all
areas of a municipality.
The distributive process can be and is responsive to power.
Although power can take many forms, the most apparent is political power
--the incorporation of the alienated in society into the political
processes. Its effectiveness is well documented by history and in current
events. The Irish and Italian immigrants, for example, achieved
significant gains through these means in the past, and more recently,
the Negro poor in the south and in several major cities are beginning to
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assimilate some of the benefits of political incorporation. In this
study, the poor, ethnically Italian but well-serviced East Cambridge
area is yet another example of the benefits of political representation.
But this form of power is slow to achieve, and there are other
forms which are more readily available to the residents themselves.
Loosely categorized under the term "citizen involvement," several low
profile strategies appear to be effective in obtaining some degree of
better service. In Cambridge, for example, an individual resident,
Nancy Bellows, successfully worked to have regular and thorough street
cleaning on her street, even though DPW is notoriously lax in providing
this service. The amount of effort required, hcwever, was considerable,
and it is admitted that she is well-educated and articulate.
Nevertheless, the example points the way for advocates and social workers
and others who might want to aid the disadvantaged. Another strategy
could focus on the "complaint power" factor observed in the research,
and might organize letter writing campaigns or might obtain signatures
on petitions of complaint. Copies of these, in turn, could be sent to
supervisors, administrators and high level officials. More formally,
residents might do well to organize themselves into neighborhood
associations. The case of the Beacon Hill Neighborhood Association
clearly indicates the potential effectiveness of such an organization
once it has been established. As indicated previously, however, these
forms of citizen involvement are delicate, and for many reasons often
do not appeal to the unsophisticated and disadvantaged.
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Furthermore, if the reasons for poor service are more deeply rooted,
such efforts-on the part of residents will most likely fail to achieve
any meaningful improvement. As such, grievances can accumulate, and the
underlying tensions of the powerless may be released, as the Civil
Disorders Report has recorded, in an extra-legal manner. After the
disorders of Roxbury in the summer of 1967, Gordan notes 5 0 "a remarkable
change had taken place" in the levels of service provided to this
area. Garbage piles had been removed from vacant lots and the district's
general condition was greatly improved.
But it is unfortunate, indeed, that the poor must resort to
violence to obtain minimally adequate service. Furthermore, the long
range effects of a riot upon service levels are debatable. When
modelled in the computer simulation, a riot produced peak pressure on
administrators, and they responded by drawing off resources previously
allocated to other areas. But pressure in these areas began to rise as
a result, and at the same time pressure in the riot area began to subside.
After several months the service levels in both areas had returned to
their original states.
In some special cases where the distribution of municipal
services is so lopsided that discrimination is apparent, the disadvantaged
may invoke the power of the law.
The central question in legal cases involving disparities in the
distribution of municipal services provided free-of-charge is whether or
not the courts should intervene in the exercising of administrative
discretion. There are two arguments favoring the preservation of the
discretion of municipal officials in controlling the distribution of
services. The first is that the exercise of discretion is a necessary
aspect of 'the allocation of scarce resources. Since available funds
are generally insufficient to satisfy more than a fraction of all
municipal needs, someone must decide which needs will be dealt with
immediately and which ones will be postponed indefinitely. Such
decisions should be made by elected or properly appointed officials who
are accountable to the people affected. Judges are ill-suited for
involvement in the intricacies of such fiscal policy-making. The second
argument focusses on the premise that the successful administration of
any service, whether it be providing polica protection, managing refuse
collection operations, or overseeing the repair and maintenance of the
sewer system, requires the freedom to innovate and react to unanticipated
situations. The intervention of the courts into official decision-
making may inhibit creative administration and introduce rigidity into
the treatment of social problems, by prohibiting more flexible and
discretionary approaches.
Admittedly, some discretion is needed. But unchecked discretion is
often abused, and the misery, despair, and alienation of many of the
powerless and the poor in society dictate that control in one form or
another is also necessary. The equal protection clause in the Fourteenth
Amendment provides one entry for this control.
51
It has been argued successfully that if one neighborhood receives
inadequate municipal services while another neighborhood receives
excellent municipal services, and if there is no rational basis for the
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difference, then the residents of the first neighborhood are being
denied eqial protection under the laws. The equal protection clause
does not require a municipality to provide any service at all, but
if a municipality does undertake to provide a service, then it must do
so on a-nondiscriminatory basis. The-question remains, though,of
defining "equal treatment." In the case of Hawkins v. Shaw, it was clear
that there was unequal treatment. The services in question were local
improvements which are easily quantifiable, and one area received
nearly all these services while the other received none. In cases
where the issues involve quality rather than quantity and concern
services which are rendered according to needs, however, the question of
equal treatment will be a difficult one to answer.
The court ruled in this case that the town failed to provide any
compelling reason which could justify the vast disparities in the
distribution of municipal services. Pending appeal to the U. S. Supreme
Court, the town is ordered to provide street paving, street lighting,
curbing, sewerage, 'water mains, fire hydrants, traffic lights and
sidewalks in the black area of Shaw where almost none of these services
now exist. Presumably, the costs of such an undertaking will be
relatively enormous for a small town.
Since the services in question- are indeed amenable to service
charging, one might speculate that the town could simply shift its
service policies and circumvent the court order. By affixing service
charges to such local improvements, the town might successfully deny .the
poor these services economically, or might argue that it is too risky
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to finance such services in their area. It is noted that when litigation
was simulated in the computer model, it had negligible affects upon
service levels in cases where disparities were large but not as clearly
quantifiable as those above. In refuse collection, for example, a large
portion of disparity is due to qualitative differences and not to
quantitative differences. Furthermore, in the ambiguous cases the courts
have ruled in favor of the preservation of administrative discretion. 52
For some services, the enactment of service charging would be ideal
if the costs of the services were subsidized on the part of the poor.
Today there is national and state subsidization of the poor for the costs
of food, clothing, shelter and other needs; is it not reasonable to
include among these a few of the basic municipal services as well? If
one wishes to equalize society as well as environmental quality, then
service charging would be ideal if coupled with income transfers to the
poor, for this scheme would help to achieve more redistributive effects.
However, since this subsidization does not seem likely in the near
future, some strategies should focus on the prevention of policy shifts
toward service charging. As it was pointed out in Chapter III, the
consequences of such a shift would be injurious to the poor; they would
have to pay out a larger percentage of their incomes for the most
necessary of services which they had received free before, and would be
denied economically others which they could not afford but could live
without. The purpose of imposing service charges, however, is not to
exclude anyone, but simply to finance the costs of the services -and to
relieve overall fiscal pressure.
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Thus, one general category of strategies could aim at relieving
fiscal pressure. This proposal invites numerous suggestions, but one
that stands out in particular is national legislation to alleviate the
financial crises of urban areas--a concept currently embodied in "revenue
sharing." other strategies, however, focus upon reducing service costs
and increasing efficiency.
Evidence indicates that municipal agencies, as a rule, are poorly
managed. .Certainly this is so in Cambridge. There are innumerable
ways in which research and innovation can be applied to municipal service
systems. As one example, refuse collection vehicles in Cambridge use
no routing plans; they frequently miss streets altogether, and routes
in several districts are not contiguous. The result of this is
increased overtime to cover the missed streets, the hiring of additional
private contractors and the assignment of "routing" cars to lead the
collection vehicles through the maze of non-contiguous routes--all
contributing to monetary wastefulness. Furthermore, if routes were
instituted for street cleaning, street inspection and other services,
perhaps services might be distributed more equitably. Thus, solutions
to the routing problem combined with numerous other innovations could all
contribute to the reduction of service costs, improvement of service
efficiency and distribution, and to the increase of service levels in
all neighborhoods. As an example of the applicability of modern
mathematical and heuristic techniques to public sector problems, the
author's own work on the refuse collection vehicle routing problem
above is included in Appendix C.
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Although preventing service charging may be one special consequence
of fiscal relief and service efficiency, the more common benefits are
simply that more resources are available for allocation. In the computer
simulation of the distributive process, two specific strategies when
implemented together did more for the disadvantaged than all others.
These were: an increase in resources, reflecting both increased service
efficiency and an increase in service budgets, and the imposition of
better management in municipal agencies. More resources allowed more
services to be distributed to all areas and better management induced
higher quality levels in the low income areas, although it did not
affect significantly the quantitative proportions between the two areas.
Although one must not rely too heavily on this simulation, the
implications of its conclusions seem reasonable.
It is difficult if not impossible. to achieve some measure of
environmental equality among residential areas with vastly different
sociocultural and economic characteristics. But it is possible to
achieve some measure of service adequacy for the disadvantaged.
Admittedly, however, to do this seems to require giving other areas
much more than simply adequate service, and disparities in the
distribution of municipal services seem destined to exist indefinitely.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX A: PUBLIC SERVICES AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION RATES
Regarding the question of what is an equitable distribution of
municipal services, it may be appropriate to say that for some services
equal (pro rata) amounts would be equitable; but for others this
measure is clearly inappropriate. Some residential areas have far greater
needs for health and sanitation services, for remedial and police
services, than do others. It has been claimed throughout this thesis
that the needs and preferences of different residential areas, for
certain kinds of services may vary, and that they reflect the different
sociocultural and economic conditions of their respective areas. As
evidence in support of this, the following study is briefly reviewed.
Benson and Lund, 53 of the Institute of Governmental Studies at the
University of California, Berkeley, conducted a one-year study of the
neighborhood distribution of local public services. One objective of
the study was to examine the hypothesis that upper and middle income
households, which are more mobile than lower income households, will
remain in a community only as long as they perceive that a large portion
of their tax payments are allocated to the support of services which
they use rather than to the support of remedial and income transfer
programs. Thus, a major assumption at the outset of the study was that
different groups of residents used and consumed different types of
services in varying rates and that these rates could be systematically
related to observable socio-economic characteristics such as income,
education and occupation of the heads of households.
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They chose three distinct neighborhoods in Berkeley which were,
generally speaking, internally similar with respect to income, education
and occunational level of the head of the household as shown in Table 5.
Area A was characterized by "low" values in socio-economic indicators,
Area C by "high" values, and Area B by values somewhere near the middle.
The public services which they examined were of six categories: health,
police, inspection, libraries, recreation and education. Although these
services are much broader in nature than municipal services, police,
environmental sanitation, inspection and recreational services were all
included in the study.
The results of their research suggest that the demand for certain
kinds of services varies significantly among different kinds of
neighborhoods. Using the notation shown in Table 6 , one can observe in
Table 7 a distinct correlation between participation and socio-economic
characteristics.
Subsequently, Benson and Lund categorized services into two sets in
the conclusions of their report, "Neighborhood Distribution of Local
Public Services." Services were categorized according to use
characteristics such that in one were "poverty-related services" and
in the other were "developmental services." Poverty-related services
consist of remedial services, services which relate to the incidence of
physical handicaps or disease in poor households, and services which
reflect the socially disruptive activities that concentrations of
poverty appear to breed. Developmental services i.nclude educational
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Table 5
U.S. Census of Population (1960) Data
for Three Berkeley Neighborhoods
IRati o of
Population Median Median Prof/Skilled
Area Family School Worker to1960 Income Years Semi/Unskilled
1959 1960 1960
A
Census Tract 2A 2,997 $5,188 10.7 2:3
2B 4,997 4,750 10.4 1:2
2C 3,968 5,128 12.1 8:9
2D 3,130 6,307 11.0 1:1
Total 15,072
B
Census Tract 4C 6,027 6,520 12.7 4:1
4D 3,535 6,420 12.0 2:1
4E 5,264 6,486 12.4 3:2
Total 14,826
C
Census Tract 6B 3,850 10,926 16+ 16:1
6C 2,159 11, 902 16+ 15:1
6D 4,143 12,283 16+ 13:1
6E 4,532 8,590 13.1 7l
Total 14,684
Table 6
Categories of Participation
(Each neighborhood = 1-% of Berkeley population)
% of the Neighbor- Involvement Symbol
hood's Share of Services Rating Used in Table
Less than 5% Very low VL
5 - 9.9 Low L
10 - 19.9 Typical T
20 - 24.9 High H
25 and over Very high VH
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Table 7
Partial Summary:
Relative Degree of Participation of Neighborhoods
in Local Public Services
Service
Health
Nursing:
Chronic Disease
Acute Communicable Disease
Environmental Sanitation
Tuberculosis:
Clinic
Nursing Visits
Venereal Disease:
Nursing Visits
Other
Police
Detective
Juvenile
Ambulance
Special Detail
Beat Patrol
Inspection
Zoning Complaints
Other Specific Calls
Block-by-Block Survey
Libraries
Main Circulation
Branch Circulation
Recreation
Recreation Centers
Workreation
Vacation Camps
Education
Senior High School:
Regular
Special Programs
A
VH
VH-
VH
VH
VH
VH
VH
H
VH
H
VH
H
L
VH
VH
VL
L
VH
T
VL
T
H
Neighborhood
B
L
L
T
T
T
VL
L
T
T
T
L
L
VL
VH
VL
T
T
L
T
L
T
T
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C
VL
T
L
VL
L
T
VL
L
L
L
L
T
VH
VL
VL
T
VH
L
H
VH
T
VL
4-
I
I
1~
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services, libraries and recreational activities. *Clearly, different
residents have different needs and preferences for certain kinds of
services, and these needs and preferences are correlated to socio-
economic characteristics. It must be added, however, that these
conclusions are not to imply that different classes in society have
different needs and preferences for all services. Preferences for
environmental amenities, for example, may be ident.cal among different
classes even though the upper classes may receive more in the processes
of distribution.
APPENDIX B: DYNAMO MODEL OF THE DISTRIBUTIVE PROCESS
Following this page is a listing of a computer model of the
distributive process for municipal services rendered free-of-charge as
it was conceptualized in Chapter III. The model was programmed in
DYNAMO II for the IBM 360/75 computer. The purpose was primarily to
lend understanding to the interactions of the different variables
and forces acting within the process and to provide insights into the
effects and implications of specific relief strategies. For simplicity,
the model simulates only one service, refuse collection, and considers
only two, but polarized, areas in a municipality.
A thorough description of the model is felt to be unnecessary here
and would be rather tedious.' Generally speaking, its construction
reflects the explicit schematic diagrams in Chapter III, but if one wishes
to study it more carefully or use it as an example for other simulations,
a documented listing is provided.
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* MUNICIPAL SERVICES ALLOCATION MODEL
NOTE
NOTE ---THE FOLLOWING MODEL IS FOR RE
NOTE
NOTE
NOTE I. COMMUNITY GENERATOR:
NOTE SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTIC
NOTE MUNICIPAL JURISDICTION ARE GE
NOTE THE TWO AREAS START AS IDENTI
NOTE AREA2 IMPROVES.
NOTE
A SK=TABLE(SITTIME.K,0950, 10)
T SiT=5/4/3/2/1/1
A S2.K=TABLE(S2TiIME.K,0,50,10)
T S2T=5/6/7/8/9/9
A POPI.K=TABLE(PTTIME.KO0995,50)
T P1T=40000/40000
A POP2.K=T ABLE (P2T, T IME.KO0950,50)
T P2T=40000/40000
A PD1.K=TABLE(PDTvS1.Kv091010)
A PD2.K=TABLE(PDTvS2eKv0q1010)
T PDT=25000/5000
NOTE
NOTE
NOTE II. MONETARY CONSTRAINTS UPON THE
NOTE BIWEEKLY BUDGET IS COMPUTED 0
NOTE TOTAL SERVICE UNITS COMPUTED
A B8.K=SM0OTH(DBB.K,BDEL)
A DB8.K=(1.O-CF.K)(CPSUC)(SUNI.K+S
A CF.K=C1*CLIP(OISWT39TIME.K)
C SWT3=20
L . TSUJ.K=TSJ.jDT*(TSUPP.JK-SUAPPI.
R TS0PP.KL =B.K/CPSUC
A TSNR.K=TSU.K/(SUN1.K+SUN2.K)
NOTE
NOT
'~0
FUSE COLLECTION SERVICES
S OF TWO AREAS WITHIN A
NERATED EXOGENOUSLY.
CAL, AREA1 THEN DECAYS AS
SOC/EC INDICATOR
SOC/EC INDICATOR
POPULATION
POPUL ATION
POP DENSITY (PEOPLE/SO MI)
POP DENSITY (PEOPLE/So MI)
POP DENS TABLE
ALLOCATION OF SERVICE:
VER ONE QUARTER YEAR
FROM BUDGET
BIWEEKLY BUDGET
UN2.K) DESIRED BUDGET
COST FACTOR
JK-SUAPP2. JK)
TSU PER PERIOD
TOT SERV TO NEEDS RATIO
Ti
NOTE
NOTE
L
R
R
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
T
A
T
A
A
A
A
A
A
'OT E
NOTE
NOTE
L
R
T
A
A
A
R
A
A
A
NOTE
B. ALLOCATION OF QUALITY or SERVICE
AQSUl.K=AQSUl.J+DT*(S1.JK-QC1. K),
QSl.KL=TAL (AQSUT,QFl.K0,,2e,1)
AQSUT=.80/.95/1.00
QFl.K=E81.K+ACloK
EBl.K=TABLE(EBT9S.KO0*10,5)
EBT=0.5/1.0/1.2
AC.K=TABHL(ACT#AD1 .Kv0,29l)
ACT=0/0/1
OCI.KL=AQSUI.K.
LOSPI.K=SUA1.K*AQSUI.K
LOSNI.K=SUN1.K*1.00
LOSRI.K=LOSPI.K/LOSNI.K
VIA ADRIN CONTROL---
AVG QUAL LEVEL OF SU IN AREA
QUAL SUPPLIED (0-100%)
QUAL FACTOR
EMPLOYEE BIASES
EMPLOYEE BIAS TABLE
ADMIN CONTROL
ADMIN CONTROL TABLE
QUAL CONSUMED (= QUAL SUP)
LEVEL OF SERVICE PROVIDED
LEVEL OF SERVICE NEEDED
LEVEL OF SERVICE RATIO
4..,"..
III. ALLOCATIONAL SUBMODEL FOR AREAlt
A. ALLOCATION OF SERVICE UNITS (SU)---
SUA1.K=SUA1.J+DT*(SUAPP1.JK-SUCPPI.JK) SU ALLOC PER PERIOD
SUCPPI.KL=SUA1.K SO CO4SUMED PP
SUAPP1.KL=SUAECI.K+SUAAP1.K SU ALLOC PER PERIOD
SUAEC1.K=(SUDI.K)(SMOOTH(EC.KECDEL)) SU ALLOC BY EXOG CONSTRAINTS
EC.K=ECV*CLIP(0,1,,20TIME.K) EXOGENOUS CONSTRAINTS ON ALLOC
SUD1.K=TSU.K*PNI.K SU DESIRED WITHIN FEASIBILITY
PNI.K=SUN1.K/(SUN.K+SUN2.K) DESIRED FRACTIONAL SPLIT
SUN1.K=(RGI.K/CAPSU)*(PDF1.K) SERVICE UNITS NEEDED
RGl.KuPOPl.K*RGPC1.K/26 REFUSE GENERATED PER PERIOD
RGPC1.K=TABLE(RGiPCTS1.KO,10,S) REF GEN PER CAPITA (CU YD/YR)
RGPCT=0o.90/1.40/1.8o0 RGPC TABLE (CUBIC YDS PER YR)
PDF1.K=TABLE(PDFT,PD1.K,5000,25000,5000) POP DENSITY FACTOR
PDFT=1.0/1.075/1.15/1.4/1.6 POP DENS FACTOR TABLE
SUADR1.K=SUA1.K/SUD1.K SU ALLOC TO DESIRED RATIO
SANRI.K=SUAI.K/SUNI.K SU ALLOC TO NEEDED RATIO
SUAAPI.K=SUU.K*NRAPI.K SU ALLOC BY ADMIN PROCESS
SUJI.K=TSU.K-SUAEC1.K-SUAEC2.K SU UNALLOC
NRAP1.K=FAP1.K/(FAP1.K+FAP2.K) NORMALIZED RATIO OF FAP'S
rAPl.K=AD1.K*PIl.K FACTORS IN THE ADMIN PROCESS(~I)
NOTE
NOTE
NOTE
A
NOTE
A
T
A
A
T
NOT E
A.
A
NOTE
A
N
A
NOTE
A
T
A
NOTE
A
A
T
A
A
OTE
NOTE
r)
C. FACTORS INFLUENCING THE ALLOCATIONAL PROCESS--
--1. ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION
AD1.K=(EQSI.K+RDPM1.K)/2 . ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION
--- (A) ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY STANDARD
EQS1.K=TABHL(EGST,AdleK,-1,I,1 ENV QUAL STD (NOT EXPLICI
EOST=0/1/2 EOS TABLE
AB1.K=BI.K*TABHL(MABT,Sl.K,0,1O,5) ADMINISTRATOR BIAS
BI.K=BAI+BA2*CLIP(O1,20,TIME.K) BIAS AMPLIFIER
MABT=-.3/0/.2 MODERATE ADMIN BIAS TABLE
--- (B) RESIDENT DEMANDS/PRESSURE MULTIPL IER
RDI.K=TABL(RDPMTRRDP.K,0,2,.25) RES OEM/PRESSURE MULT
RD>MT=O ./.5/.T/.85/1.0/1*15/1.30/2.00/3.00
RRDPI.K= (RDPl.K*2.0) / (RDP1.K+RDP2.K) RELATIVE RDP'S
RD1.oK=RES DEMANDS/PRESSURE
RDPI.K=(SWTI.K+(l-SWT1.K)(PNM1.K)(RDF1.K))+SMOOTH(RPF.KPFDEL
RP-1=0 RES PRESSURE FACTOR (RIOT
SWTI.K=C LIP(0,1,ROFl.K,1.01)
RDFl.K=RESIDENTS DEMANDS FACTOR
ROF.K=TABHL(RIMT,Sl.K,0,1O5)*TABHL(RGMTGVI.K ,O,1e.2)
RIT=.7/1.0/2.0 RES INTOLERANCE (OF POnR SERVIVCE) MULT TABLE
RGMT=1.0/1.3/1.5/1.8/2.8/4.0 RES GREIVANCES MULT TABLE
GV1.K=(LOSNl.K-LOSPI.K)/LOSN1.K GREIVANCES
RPF1.K=RES PRESSURE FACTOR
RPFI.K=CLIP(0,1eNOISE () PFl.K)*TABHL (RGMT,GV1.K,0,1,.2) (RIF)
PF1.K=TABHL(PFT.LOSR1.K,0,1,.1) PRESSURE FACTOR
PF T = e /.45/. 4/. 35/. 30/0.0/-. 25/-. 40/-o48/-.5/-.5
PNMi.K=((RUMC.K)+(1-RUMC.K) (RAADl.K)) PERCEIVED NEEDS MULT
Rt1C.K=TABLE(RUMCTwGTP.K,0,10,2.5) RELIANCE UPON MANAGEMENT
RU MCT=0/. 15/.30/.75/1.0
GTp.K=5+(GTYPE)*CLIP(0,i,20.TIME.K) TYPE OF GOV.T (EFFICIENCY
G rYPE=0
RAAD(K:=TABLE(RAADTS1.K,0,1O,5I RES ABILITY TO ARTICULATE
RAADTzc.4/l.0/1.2 RAAD TABLE
-- ?2 POLITICAL INFLUENCE UPON THE ALLOC PROCESS
PII.K IS NOT MODELLED
)
DESIRES
I
CONTROL
)
)
A PII.K=1.0
NOTE
NOTE
NOTE IV. ALLOCATIONAL SUBMODEL FOR AREA2:
NOTE A. ALLOCATION OF SERVICE UNITS (SU) ---
L SUA2.K=SUA2.J+DT*(SUAPP2.JK-SUCPP2.JK) SU ALLOC PER PERIOD
R SUCPP2.KL=SUA2.K SU CONSUMED PP
R SUAPP2.KL=SUAEC2.K+SUAAP2.K SU ALLOC PER PERIOD
A SUAEC2.K=(SUD2.K)(SMOOTH(EC.KtECDEL)) SU ALLOC BY EXOG CONSTRAINTS
A SUD2.K=TSU.K*PN2.K SU DESIRED WITHIN FEASIBILITY
A PN2.K=SUN2.K/(SUNI.K+SUN2eK) DESIRED FRACTIONAL SPLIT
A SUN2.K=(RG2.K/CAPSU)*(POF2.K) SERVICE UNITS NEEDED
A RG2.K=POP2.K*RGPC2.K/26 REFUSE GENERATED PER PERIOD.
A RGPC2.K=TABLE(RGPCTS2.KO,1O,5) REF GEN PER CAPITA (CU YD/YR)
A PDF2.K=TABLE(PDFTPD2.K,5000,2500095000) POP DENSITY FACTOR
A SUADR2.K=SUA2.K/SUD2.K SU ALLOC TO DESIRED RATIO
A SANR2.K=SUA2.K/SUN2iK SU ALLOC TO NEEDED RATIO
A SUAAP2.K=SUU.K*NRAP2.K SU ALLOC BY ADMIN PROCESS
A NRAP2.K=FAP2.K/(FAPI.K+FAP2.K) NORMALIZED RATIO OF FAPOS
A FAP2.K=AD2.K*PI2.K FACTORS IN THE ADMIN PROCESS
NOTE
NOTE
NOTE B. ALLOCATION OF QUALITY OF SERVICE VIA AD4IN CONTROL---
AQSU2.K=AQSU2.J+DT*(QS2.JK-QC2.JK) AVG QJAL LEVEL OF SU IN AREA
R QS2.KL=TABHL(AQSUTQF2.KO,2,1) QUAL SUPPLIED (0-100%)
A QF2.K=EB2.K+AC2.K QUAL FACTOR
A EB2.K=TABLE(EBTvS2.K90,1o5) EMPLOYEE BIASES
A AC2.K=TABHL(ACT*AD2iK*0291) ADMIN CONTROL
R QC2.KL=AQSU2.K QUAL CONSUMED (= QUAL SUP)
A LOSP2.K=SUA2.K*AQSU2.K LEVEL OF SERVICE PROVIDED
A LOSN2.K=SUN2.K*1.00 LEVEL OF SERVICE NEEDED
A LOSR2.K=LOSP2.K/LOSN2.K LEVEL OF SERVICE RATIO
NOTE
NOTE
I ________________________________________ 
_____________ 
____________________p
NOTE
NOTE
A
NOTE
A
A
NOTE
A
A
NOTE
A
N
A
NOTE
A
A
A
A
NOTE
NOTE
NOTE
NOTE
N
N
N
NUTE
C
C
INITIAL VALVYE CARDS
DSB=1I4682
AQt~i-..95
AQSU2,95
CONSTANT DEFINITION CARDS
0_0
c.Duc "a
(DOL. ARS)
TOTAL SERVICE UNITS
BUDGET DELAY (PERIODS)
% INCREASE/DECREASE
CPSU CONSTANT
C. FACTORS INFLUENCING THE ALLOCATIONAL PROCESS---
--I. ADMINISTRATIVE OISCRETXON
AD2.K= (EQS2.K+RDPM2.K) /2 ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION
--- (A) ENVIRONMENTAt 3UALITY STANDARD
EQS2.K=TABHL(EOSTAB2.K.-l,.,1) ENV QuAL STO (NOT EXPLICIT)
AB2.K=61.K*TABHL(MAST,S2.Ko,1O,5) ADMINISTRATOR BIAS
--- (B) RESIDENT DEMANDS/PRESSURE MULTIPLIER
RDPM2.K=TABHL (RDPMT+RRDP2oK,02,.2S) RES DEM/PRESSURE MULT
RRDDP2.K*2.0)/(RDP.K+RDP2.K) RELATIVE RDP*S
RDP2.K=RES DEMANDS/PRESSURE
RD>2.K= (SWT2.K+(--SW T2.K)(PNM2.K) (RDF2.K))+SMOOTH(RPF20 K,PFDEL)
R PF2=0 RES PRESSURE FACTOR (RIOT)
SWT2e K=C~LP (0 9 RDF2.K~ ,1.01)
RDF.=RES2ENTS DE MANDS FACTOR
RDF2.K=T ASHL (R IMT oS2.K e 010 ,) *T ABHL (RGMT eGV2.K *0,9 .2)
GV2.K= (L OSN2.K-LOSP2.K)/LOSN2.K GREIVANCES
RPF2.K=R ES PRESSURE FACTOR
RPF2.K=CLIP,1,NOISE oPF2.K)*TAHL(RGMT ,GV2.K,0,Is.2)(RIF)
PF2.K=T ABHL(PFTLOSR2.KOl9,.1) PRESSURE FACTOR
PNM2.K= (RUMC.K)+(-RUMC.K) (RAAD2.K)) PERCEIVED NEEDS MULT
RAAD2.K=TABLE(RAADTS2.K0,10,5) RES ABILITY TO ARTICULATE DESIRES
--. POLITICAL INFLUENCE UPON THE ALLOC PROCESS
PI2.K IS NOT MODELLED
P I2.0K= 0
0%
C ECVZO EC:;VALUE (~OF SU ALLOC)
C CAPSU=6 CAPACITY PER SU (CU YDS)
C ECDEL=1O EC TIM4E DELAY (PERIODS)
C 8A1.O
C BA20.oO
c RIF=I.O0 RIOT INTENSITY FACTOR (SENSIY)
*c PFDEL=3 PRESSURE FACTOR TIME DELAY
NOTE
NOTE CONTROL CARDS
C DTIl
C LENGTH:W5O
A PLT~l ERoK-CL!P(PLTMINPLTMAXPLTCTTIME.K)
-C PLTMINIl
C PLmAX1l
C PLTCT=500
A PRTPER.KCLIPPRT4INPRTMAxPRTCTTI4E.K)
C PRTMIN=5
C PRTMAX=10
C PRTCT=30
PRINT 1) (OtO)SUA1,SUAAPI ,S"UAECI ,SUDI oSUN1
PRINT 2) (OO)SUA2,SUAAP2,SUAEC2,SUD2,SUN2
PRINT 3) (0,O)RG1,LOSP1,LOSN1,TSUBB
PRINT 4) (9oC)RG2vLOSP29LOSN2,*9DBB
PRINT 5) (O,3)S1,PN1,RGPCI.*1PDF1,SUADRINRAP1
PRINT 6) tO,3)S2;PW42,RGPC2,PDF2,SUADR2,NRAP2
PRINT 7)(.Ap3)FAP~,QslQF1,EB1,AC1,LOSRI
PRINT 8) (O,3)FAP2,QS2,QF29EB2,AC2,LOtCR2
PRINT 9)(o,3)AD1,EQS1,ROPM1,ABI,*RRDP1,NDPI
PRINT 10)) (03)AD2,EQS2,RDPM2,AB2,PRRDP2,PRDP2
PR~INT 11) (0,3)RDF1,PNMIRAADlGVIPFISANRI
PRINT 12) (O,3)RDF2,DPNM2,RAAD2,GV2,PPF2,PSANR2
PRINT 13) (0,3)TSNRAQSU1,AQSU2
PLOT S1-1 (0v20)/SUA1 SSiJNIN(2OO,600)/AQSU1=Q(.7,1.1)/RPF1-0C(O,10)/LOS
RI4=LEQSI=ERDPMI=OPNM=PAOI=A( .5,1.5)
PLO'l 5SO,2O)?/SUA2StSN2N(2O,6O)/ASU2=Q(71.-1)/RPF2C(O,1O)/LOS,
t-?2.LEQ$2.=ERDPM2=DPNM2PAD2"A(.59195)
RUN DIASPLIAYO TRANSITIONAL INTERACTIONS.
TP SIT 2*5/2*5/2o5/2.5/2.S/2.S
TP S2T-7.s/7*5/7*5/7*5/7*5/7*5
RUN POLARIZED COMMUNITIES: EQUILIBRIUM
CP BA2=1.0
CP GTYPE=-2
CP C1=.10
RUN SOUTHERN TOWN
RUN SOUTbIERN TOWN EQUILIBRIUM
CP aA2=0
CP CI=-.1o
CP GTYPE=4
CP ECV=.75
RUN GOOD GOVERNMENT
- RUN GOOD GOVERNMENT EQUILIBRIUM
co
APPENDIX C: PUBLIC SECTOR VEHICLE ROUTING--OPTIMIZATION AND HEURISTIC
TECHNIQUES
At several places in the text, the point has been made that fiscal
pressure and the rising costs of municipal services are not the only
important factors influencing the distribution of municipal services
among all residents, but are also potentially injurious to the powerless
and the poor. Rising costs may precipitate service cuts and these fall
hardest upon those least able to resist them or may force municipal
policies to shift toward greater use of service charging. As explained
in several places, service charging can force the poor to pay even
larger percentages of their incomes for basic needs, or may deny them-
economically services which they may now receive.
As fiscal pressure increases with rising costs, growing demands and
lagging resources, many municipalities are somewhat belatedly beginning
to invest in research and technological innovation as a means of
increasing efficiency. Increased efficiency may- result in higher quality
of service, but more importantly may avoid, or at least forestall
reductions in service levels. Presented below is one application of
research and technological innovation to the problem of public sector
vehicle routing.
ANALYSIS OF THE REFUSE COLLECTION PROBLEM
Although the problem of refuse disposal has been the focus of much
attention in the light of recent environmental concern, a study by
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Ludwig and Black reveals that 85 percent of the solid waste system
costs in this country is due to collection, while only 15 percent is due
to disposal. Thus, in the short run at least, some of the financial
pressure upon the solid waste system may be relieved by improving collec-
tion efficiency.
There are many facets of the collection system operations which
lend themselves to analysis: manpower allocation, incentive systems,
56
capital budgeting for equipment and others. Marks and Liebman have
noted, for example, that a significant inefficiency in current collection
operations is the long trip to the dumping site which the garbage truck
and its crew must make two or three times a day. They have suggested a
scheme for setting up local transfer facilities where the collection
vehicle transfers its load to a different vehicle which is more suited
for making the longer runs, while allowing the garbage truck to make
more use of its time collecting refuse rather than carrying it. The
particular facet chosen for analysis here, however, is that of routing
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the vehicles along city streets. Stricker analyzes part of the
routing problem as follows:
"As vehicles have become larger and more efficient, each
one can service a greater area with no increase in the
size of the crew. Due to the complexity of the [rerouting]
problem, though, as collection fleets become mondernized,
instead of completely restructuring routes . . . city
administrators merely append bits and pieces of a phased
out route to remaining routes. This often results in
obvious inefficiencies such as routes which are no longer
contiguous."
Furthermore, Stricker cites in his study of Cambridge, Massachusetts,
increased overtime, the hiring of additional private contractors and
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the assignment of "routing" vehicles to lead the collection vehicles
through the maze of non-contiguous routes as examples of monetary
wastefulness directly resulting from inefficient routing.
There is, of course, a difference between the "best" route and
the most efficient route. Objectives such as the equalization of work
loads, promoting compatibility between truck capacity and estimated
pickup loads, and the districting of routes in an optimal way with
respect to long haul dump trips are perhaps more important considera-
tions. Given the district boundaries, however, the routing problem
then becomes one of how to travel every street while minimizing.total
distances travelled.
INTRODUCTION TO THE CHINESE POSTMAN PROBLEM
The problem of finding the shortest route through a street network
such that every street is travelled at least once has interested man
for centuries. This problem is basic not only to the operations of
refuse collection, but also to other public sector operations such as
street cleaning. The related problem, known in network theory as the
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Chinese Postman Problem , is to trace the shortest continuous path
through a network such that every arc is covered at least once. Before
continuing, the following simple definitions are presented to avoid
confusion in terminology:
arc a line joining two and only two nodes
node a point of junction of two or more arcs
network a set of nodes plus a set of arcs
connecting them. Same as graph.
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directed arc an arc which may be.traversed only in
in a specific direction
undirected arc an arc which may be traversed in either
direction
directed network a network composed only of directed arcs
undirected network a network composed only of undirected
arcs
bidirected network a network composed of directed and
undirected arcs
isthmus an arc whose removal from a network
would divide that network into two sep-
arate parts
connected network a network having no isthmus
degree of a node the number of undirected arcs incident
to a node plus the number of directed
arcs leaving the node minus the number
of directed arcs entering that node
even node a node having an even degree
odd node a node having an uneven degree
path a set of arcs in an undirected network
such that every arc terminates where
the subsequent arc begins
Euler tour a path through a network such that every
arc is covered exactly once
cycle a path ending at its point of origin
The earliest mention of the minimum arc covering problem is by
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Euler in ]736 at-which time he proved theorems showing the existence
of an "Euler tour" in either a directed or undirected network. Either
type of network possesses an Euler tour if and only if it is connected,
and the number of nodes with uneven degrees is zero or two. Since an
Euler tour covers every arc once and only once, it is obviously the
shortest possible arc covering tour. Examples of networks possessing
Euler tours are shown here:
no odd no odd no odd two odd
nodes nodes nodes nodes
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Notice that Euler tours of networks with two odd nodes are not cyclic,.
that is they do not begin and end in the same place. Also, it should
be mentioned, every network having odd nodes will always have an even
number of odd nodes. This is because every arc has two end points, and
the total degree of any network is two times the number of arcs, which
is an even number.
To continue, if a network has more than two odd nodes, it posses-
ses no Euler tour. Thus if every arc in this type of network is to be
covered at least once, certain arcs must be covered more than once.
This is demonstrated by the following sequence:
This network has four odd nodes and as such
possesses no Euler tour. At least one arc
must be covered twice in order to cover all I
arcs at least once. One possible tour is
shown.
If we add the stipulation that a tour must
be cyclic, we see that for every network
having 2n odd nodes, at least n arcs must
be covered twice. In this case 2n=4 and
thus two arcs must be duplicated.
60
From another point of view what we are
really doing is adding "pseudo arcs" to the
network where arcs are covered twice, and
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by artifically changing odd nodes
into even nodes in this way, the
modified network then possesses a
cyclic Euler tour.
Clearly there are several different ways to accomplish this, each
yielding a different cyclic Euler tour, each with a different total arc
length. Thus the Chinese Postman Problem takes the form of a game:
"How does one optimally pair the odd nodes such that the sum of the
pseudo arc lengths is a minimum?"
MATHEMATICAL STRUCTURE
Although the Chinese Postman Problem is highly structured, algorithms
for finding the optimal solution are somewhat limited. The mathematical
formulation is straightforward.
N N
Minimize E E C.. X..
i=1 j=1 ' 13
subject to:
N N
E - E Xik
k=1 k=l
x.. + X..
13 3i
= 0
- 1 for all arcs (i,j) A
X. > 0 and is integer
(1) objective
, function
(2) conservation
of flow, i.e.,
the number of
times travelled
into a node
equals the num-
ber out
(3) arc coverage
constraint
(4) non-negativity
constraint
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where
N = the number of nodes in the network
A = the set of all arcs in the network
x. = the number of times the arc from node i to node j is
1' traversed
c . = the length of the arc from node i to node j
13
But the algorithms that are capable of achieving optimality require large
computational efforts. If one were to totally enumerate the possible
combination of pairs, for example, for a network with M nodes of which N
nodes were odd nodes, the following steps and effort would be required:
(a) generate all the shortest paths from each odd node
to every other odd node using the network matrix
of size M2. Of all the shortest path algorithms
researched6 1 , the best for this purpose required
(M)(M-1)/2, or about M2/2 computations.
(b) with this shortelt path information an odd node
matrix of size N *is formed with the shortest path
distances as entries. Then all possible sets of
pair combinations are evaluated as to their total
distance. For N odd nodes this effort would involve
l'3'5*7*9' '.'''.'.(N-3)'(N-1)
computations. A network having only 20 odd nodes,
for example, has 6.5x109 feasible soluations.
Thus for all practical purposes, total enumeration
is highly unsatisfactory as a means of finding the
optimal solution.
OPTIMIZATION TECHNIQUES
Better techniques have been developed, however, and they are briefly
summarized below. For a more thorough review of these one should refer
to Stricke,6 2 . Recall that there are three cases to be considered:
the bidirected network (one-way and two-way streets), the directed net-
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work (only one-way streets), and the undirected network (only two-way
streets).
For the bidirected street network no algorithm presently exists
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which can solve the arc covering problem. Although Johnson has
presented an existence theorem for an Euler tour, his work does not
lend itself easily to. applications. As yet this particular case remains
an open field for investigation.
The directed street network, however, is a case which has been
literally solved. All odd nodes in such a network can be categorized
into two exclusive groups: excessive or deficient node type. An
excessive node is one where there are more arcs leaving a node than
entering it, and a deficient node is one where there are less arcs
leaving than entering.
"excessive node" "deficient node"
It has been shown that in order to achieve optimality in the arc
covering problem every deficient node must be matched with one and only
one excessive node, and vice versa. Thus the Chinese Postman Problem
for directed street networks becomes one of optimally matching members
of one set in a. bipartite graph with members in the other set: a
simple "transportation problem" for which there are very good techniques
available.
The undirected case has been solved in one sense of the word,
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yet there still remains the nagging question of efficiency. Murty's
"Symmetric Assignment Algorithm" requires the determination of. all
shortest paths between odd nodes (step (a) above), and then performs a
branch and bound technique to the odd node matrix. The efficiency for
this second step, however, is data dependent and could be quite poor.
Edmonds'6 5 "B-Matching" routine is probably the best algorithm today
for achieving optimality. It too requires step (a) above, and them
employs the dual formulation of the arc covering problem, with much
bookkeeping, to reach optimality. Edmonds claims that the efficiency
for this second step is no worse than N /3 iterations.
In summary, solving the Chinese Postman Problem using mathematical
optimization techniques would require approximately (M)(M-1)/2 computa-
tions plus N /3 iterations of B-Matching. For many practical problems
this amount of computation could easily be afforded, however, for large
problems the cubic efficiency function provokes one to ask whether there
might be more efficient methods. This question leads, then, to the
application of heuristics, the subject and implementation of which is
the focus of the remainder of this discussion.
HEURISTICS
A particular characteristic of the Chinese Postman Problem enables
heuristic methods to achieve very good, if not optimal, results with a
greatly reduced amount of effort. This characteristic is that very
rarely is an odd node (in the optimal solution) paired with another
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that is relatively far removed from it. In other words, an odd node is
usually paired with a neighboring odd node. Thus it is possible to
make a very good decision as to which neighboring node should be paired
by looking, not at the entire network, but at a localized area, say for
example, within five oddnode depths of the node in question. When the
node has been paired, the pseudo arcs can be added, the two nodes then
become even nodes, and the process is iterated. The only problem that
may arise by focussing on a local area is that while sweeping across
the network in this fashion a node may be forgotten at one extreme of
the network, and then at the end it might have to be inefficiently paired
with the remaining odd node at the other extreme. Thus, to prevent
this the heuristics should include a global check before making each
iteration.
It should be mentioned that the human eye is fairly well suited to
play the node pairing game. The mind can "look ahead" at the conse-
quences of a particular pairing possibility, and evaluate the several
choices. The computer, however, is even more suited for the bookkeeping
effort involved in examining the many series of consequences and counter
decisions. Let us try the following sample problem by eye.
First we must convert the street
network, with an arbitrary boun-
dary, into a graph network with
the odd, even and dummy nodes
represented.
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The odd nodes (2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 9) 4 5
are represented as shaded squares.
As we try to pair the odd nodes
9 10
so that the sum of the arc lengths
between the pairs is a minimum, we
can rule out several possibilities immediately: (3-4) and (8-9),
for example. After some thought, we can pair (4-9), but have
difficulty deciding whether to pair (2-3) and (6-8) or (2-6) and
(8-3). But if we knew the exact lengths of the arcs, we could
easily decide. The solution, if it were the latter, would be
represented [(4-9), (2-5-6), (8-3)].
HEURISTIC PROGRAM
In order to illustrate the explicit heuristics used in the computer
program ( a listing of which is attached) the procedure used to find the
solution to the problem above will be explained step by step. First the
data for the street network is read as input in coordinate format. Node
types are determined, street lengths are computed or.
START
read if non-linear, and this information is then
output (see pagell 4). Then the center of mass of
all the active odd nodes is computed and the fur- NTWRK
thest node from this center is found. This proce-
A
dure for deciding which node will be paired before
others has a "gathering in" effect and prevents
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any node from being forgotten on the fringe of the
network. In the sample problem the center of mass
of the active odd nodes (meaning all six in the
first iteration) is near node 5, and thus node 3
is chosen to be examined first because it is fur-
thest from the mass center.
1 23
250 750
300 300 307 4303000
68
400 470 700
800
9 1000 $10
DCSN
The general decision process takes the following
form. If we pair node 3 with 2, there is a cost
equal to the path length between them (750 feet), but
by pairing 3 with 2, there is a resultant gain of
some length because 2 will not be paired with 4, 6, or
9. The minimum possible gain is chosen (200+300=500)
conservatively and also because the majority of nodes
are paired with their nearest neighbor. But since
node 6 can no longer be paired with 2, it is forced to
pair elsewhere. Thus the minimum resultant path to
its nearest neighbor (i.e., 8) is also considered as
a cost due to the original decision. The total cost
associated with the decision to pair node 3 with node
2 is considered to be 750-500+300=550. Similarly,
C
-110-
Idecision (3-8) has a cost of 430-300+450=580,
and decision (3-10-9) has a cost of 700+1000
-400+450=1750. Therefore, we can say that if
node 3 had the power to decide, it would prefer
node 2 to 8 by 30 feet, and node 8 to 9 by 1170
feet.
But a node pairing decision is made only
after considering the preferential scores of all
other nodes which may be candidates. Thus, after
going through the same procedure above for nodes
2, 6, and 8, the following table can be compiled:
node 3 prefers 2 to 8 by 30 and 8 to 9 by 1170
node 2 prefers 3 to 6 by 10 and 6 to 4 by .191
node 8 prefers 3 to 6 by 70 and 6 to 6 by 200
node 9 prefers 4 to 6 by 550 and 6 to 3 by 770
After a rather complicated sorting of preferences
with their appropriate decisions (see Subroutine
SCOR1 in listing for details), a linear score is
computed (no weighting is done) and the decision
to pair node 3 with 8 is made.
We pair node 3 with 8 by removing the arcs
along the path between them (one arc in this case),
which signifies that the path has been covered
twice and that it should not be covered again.
The active odd nodes 3 and 8 are set to an inactive
state, meaning that they are now considered to be
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nodes with only two arcs incident to them (i.e., a
dummy node). As the network has now been modified
we check for other active odd nodes, and if there
are some remaining we iterate beginning at
In summary, the sequence is shown diagrammatically
on the next page, (Figure 10).
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Figure 10: Heuristic Sequence
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NETWORK INFORMATION
NODE NO. XCOORD YCOOR - NODE DIST. NOCE DIST.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
9
10
0.0
250.0
1000.0
0.0
250.0..,.
450.0'
550.'0
650.0
0.,.
1000.0
0.0
0.n
0.0
300.n
300.0
300.0
200.0
250.0
700.0
700.0
14EY NOTATION ODD EVEN=O
NUMBER OF ARCS= 14
NUMBER OF 000 NODESM 6
TOTAL LINEAR FEET OF STREET=
- . COMBINATORIAL STAT ISTICS-
NUMBER OF
NUMBER OF
NUMBER OF
2
1
2
1
2
5
6
6
4
9
250.0
250.0
750.0
300.0
300.0
200.0
.150.0
800.0
400.0
1000.0
4
3
8
5
4
7
6
7
3
300.0
750.0
430.1
250.0,
250.0
150.0
150.0
150.0
471.6
700.0
NODE 01ST. NODE GIST. KEY.
0
5
10
9
9
0
3
10
0
0.0
300.0
700.0
400.0
471.6
800.0
0.0
430.1
1000.0
0.0
DUMMY=-1
6151.
MI$IMUM PATP COMPUTATIONS FOR ENTIRE
POSSIBLE 000 NOnE PAIRS - .
POSSIBLE PAIR COMBINATIONS ,
NODE PATRS PATH LENGTHS
430.
400.
500.
PATHS
3 8
9 4
2 5. 6-
TOTAL DUPLICATE STREET LENnTH w
'I
4
I-'I-A
I
0
0
0
0
6
0
0
0
0
0
-.
A.
1.
1
-1
0.0
0.0
0.0
200.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
NETWORK -0.450000E 02
0.150000E 02
0.150000E 02
SOLUTION
3
3 8
9 4
2 6
I I
Is
1330..,
CONCLUSIONS
In conclusion, the heuristic program for solving the Chinese Postman
Problem for undirected networks is a good one. Its performance on several
relatively small sized networks, designed with many snares, indicates a
high degree of reliability and accuracy, with respect to the known optimal
solutions. Furthermore, the program has the advantage over optimal pack-
ages of having a linear efficiency function with respect to the number of
odd nodes. In all trials the program has performed equally or bettern in
"the odd node pairing" game against numerous graduate students using the
hand computations described in Stricker's thesis.6
It must be added, however, that there is no guarantee of optimality.
In fact, as the number of decision pairs increases with the size of the
network, the probability of error becomes very likely, and thus the
chances of achieving optimality are rather poor for large networks.
This fact detracts little, however, from the utility of the program.
Preliminary investigation shows that street networks display the charac-
teristic of having a fairly uniform distribution of feasible Euler tours
with respect to their total tour lengths. The nature of the heuristics,
by use of the"gathering" effect and of the mutual preference scores of
node evaluations of costs versus gains to four node depths, forces solu-
tions toward the low end of this distribution. Furthermore, as the
th,
network size increases, the percentage error of the n "optimal" feasible
solution diminishes. For example, the 20 odd network found in the
appendix exhibits the following characteristics. There are more than
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6.5 x 109 feasible solutions., Of these, five Euler tour lengths are
listed below to illustrate the error sensitivity.
Tour length (feet) Error (feet) Error/best
25,619 (computer solution)
25,802 183 0.0071
26,002 383 0.0149
26,250 631 0.0246
26,682 1063 0.0415
With more testing against optimal solutions found by linear programming
packages (e.g., Edmonds' B-Matching), comparative data could determine
a probability density function of the error ratio for different sized
networks (N odd nodes), such as the hypothetical one illustrated below.
Possible PDF for Networks
of different sizes
N= 00
PDF
(% error)
N=20
- % error
5 10
In summary, the pragmatic reliability of the program when applied to real
problems such as street sweeper routes and other, is felt to be of value,
when small errors represent negligible marginal costs.
With respect to efficiency, the number of computations required for
each node pairing was not computed. My only measure of efficiency is the
K
length of computation time. On a 16 IBM 1130 with a cpu time of 3.4 usec,
the average iteration for a node pairing was about four seconds with a
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range between two and six seconds. The real value, however, in efficiency
is the program's linear efficiency function, i.e., two seconds/odd node.
Furthermore, core requirements are minimal (8 K) as compared to optimal
3
packages which may require at least an N matrix to be core resident.
In summary, I believe it could be useful after more reliability
analysis has been done.
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Figure 11: 20 Odd Node Netnork Example
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Challenge
It may be interesting to try an example by eye.
Most decisions can be made without knowing the distances
exactly, as the arcs are drawn to scale. Furthermore,
distances tend to distract one's intuition, rather than help.
But if the distances are preferred, they are provided on the
next page.
Figure 1-2
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Figure 13
-1 20-
aNETWORK INFORMATION
NODE NO.: XCOORD YCOORD 400E DIST. NODE DIST. NODE DIST.? NODE 0IST.
2 500.0
1 500.0
2 400.0
3 500.0
4 500.0
1. 525.0
3 350.0
7 500.0
7 .300.0
9 500.0
10. 500.0
6 601.8
10 450.0
13 500.0
6 775.0
15 500.0
16 400.0
12 488.2
18 604.6
15 230.0
70 900.0
71 . 270.0
72 500.0
-19 622.0
70 720.0
75 900.0
76 500.0
77 500.0
6
3
4
.5
11
12
8
4
10
8
5
2
14
11
16
-. 12
108
9
13
21
17
23
19
14
26
22
23
24
525.0
400.0
500.0
500.0
650.0
601.8
500.0
350.0
500.0
300.0
650.0
860.0
500.0
450.0
500.0
440.0
160.0
490.0
380.0
900.0
230.0
500.0
320.0
750.0
900.0
450.0
450.0
400'.0
0
12
7
8
0
15
9
10
18
11
14
18
19
24
20
17
21
19
24
25
22
26
27
28
0
27
28
0.0
860.0
350.0
350.0
0.0
775.0
300.0
300.0
490.0
500.0
450.0
488.2
380.0
750.0
230.0
400.0
230.0
604.6
622.0
720.0
270.0
450.0
450.0
- 400.0
0.0
500.0
500.0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
13
-0
16
0
0
0
0
-0
.17.
23
0
0
0
0
0
0-
0
- 0'
0.0 -1
0.0 1
0.0 1
0.0 1
0.0 -1
0.0 1
0.0 1
0.0. 1
0.0 1
450.0 0
0.0 1
440.0 0
0.0 1
0.0 1
0.0 A
0.0 1
40.0 1
160.0 C
320.0 0
0.0 1
0.0 1
0.0, 1
0.0 1
0.0 1
0.0 .-
0.0 1
0.0 1
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
- 10
12
1:3
14
15-
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24.
25
26
27
28
0.0
500'0
900.0
1400.0
190 0.:0
- 0.0
900.0
1400.-0
900.0
1400.0
1900.0
500.-0
1400.0
1900.0
0.0
500.0
900.0
900.*0
1400.'0
0.'0
900.0
900.0
1400.0
1900.0
0.0
900..0
1400.0
1900.0
KEY NOTATION ODD=
NUMSER OF ARCS= 42
NUMBER OF ODD NODES=
TOTAL LINEAR FEET OF
EVEN=0 DUMMY'.-1
20
STREETx% 20716.
COMBINATORIAL STATISTICS
NUMBER OF MINIMUM PATH COYPUTATIONS FOR ENTIRE NETWORK
NUMBER OF POSSIBLE 000 NOnE PAIRS =
NUMBER OF POSSIBLE- PATR COMBINATIONS
=0.378000E 03
0.190000E 03
0.654728E 09
KEY
I-A
0. e
0.m
0.0
O.0
0.0
525.0
350."
350. %
650.0
650.0
650.A
860."
1100."
1100.A
1300.0
1300."
1300.0
1140.0
1480. n
1530.0
153.0."%
1800.0
1800.")
1850.0
2250.0
2250.0
2250.0
2250.0 -2.0 - 0.0 0 0.0
U- 2
zs
SCLUTION NODE PATRS PATH LENGTHS PATHS
27 73 45C. 27 23
24 13 1002. 24 19 13
26 22 450. 26 22
20 15 230. 20 15
6 16 1041. 6 12 16
21 17 230. 21 17
14 11 45C. 14 11
2 3 400. 2 3
4 8 35C. 4 8
7 9 300. 7 9
TGTAL DUPLICATE STREET LEFJTH 4903.
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NETWORK I.NFORMATION
NODE NO.. XCOORD YCOORO NODE DIST. NODE DIST. NODE DIST. NODE DIST. KEY
1 0.0 0.m 2 500.0 6 525.C 0 0.0 0 0.0 -1
2 500.'0 0.0 1 500.0 -3 400.0' 12 860.0 0 0.0 -1
3 900.0 . 0. -2 400.0 4 500.0. 7 350.0 0 0.0 -L
4 1400.0 0. 3 500.0 5 500.C.' -8 350.0 0 0.0 -1
5 1900.0 , 0.0 4 500.0 11 650.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 -1
6 0.0 525.n - 1 525.0 -12 601.8 15 775.0 0 0.0 -1
7 900.0 350.A 3 350.0 .. 8 500.0 -9 300.0 0 O.C -l
8 1400.0 350.0 7 500.0 -4 350.0- 10 300.0 0 0.0 -1
9 900.0 650.0 -7 300.0 10 500.C 18 490.0 0 0.0 -1
10 1400.0 650.n 9 500.0 8 300.0 11 500.0 13 .450.0 - 0
- 1900.0 650.M 10 500.0 5 650.0 -14 450.0 0 0.0 -1
2 500.0 860.0 -6 601.8 2 860.0 18 488.2 -16' 440.0 -1
13 . 1400.0 1100.0 10 450.0 14 500.C -19 380.0 0 0.0 -1
14 1900.0 1100.0 13 500.0 -11 450.0 24 750.0 0 0.0 -1
5 0.0 1300.0 6 775.0 16 500.0 -20 230.0 0 0.0 -1
16 500.0 1300.m 15 , 500.0 -12 440.0 17 400.0 0 0.0 -l
17 900.0 1300.0 16 400.0 18 160.0 -21 230.0 0 0.0 -1
A 900.0 1140.0 12 488.2 9 .490.0 19 604.6 17 160.0 0
19 1400.0 14A.0 1F, 604.6 413 380.0 -24 622.0 23 320.0 -1
20 0.0 1530.A -15 230.0 21 900.0 25 720.0 0 0.0 -L
21 900.0 1530.0 20 C00.0 -17 230.0 22 270.0 0 0.0 -1
22 , 900.0 1800.0 21 270.0 23 500.0 -26 450.0 0 0.0 -.
23 1400.0 1800." 22 500.0 19 320.0 -27 450.0 0 -0.0 -.
24 1900.0 1850.0 -19 622.0 14 750.0 28 400.0 0 0.0 -1
25 0.0 2250.n 20 720.0 ?6 900.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 -.
26 900.0 2250.0 25 900.0 -22 450.0 27 500.0 0"- 0.0 -1
27 1400.0 2250.0 26 500.0 -23 450.0 28 500.0 0 0.0 -l
28 1900.0 2250.0 27 500.0 24 400.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 -l
(at the end).
LISTING OF HEURISTIC PROGRAM
Note:
Programmed in FORTRAN on an IBM 1130.
Core requirements:
a) program 3956
b) common 1702
c) variables 776
6434 words
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// FOR
*IOCS(2501 READER,1403 PRINTER)
*QNE WORD -4NTEGERS
INTEGER ARC(49.00)
DIMENSION RAD(4)oIRAD(4)
DIMENSION XCORD(100)9 YCORD(100),DIST(4,100),KEY(100)
COAMON XCORD9 YCORDvARC vDISTKE.YDUPL
READ(8,1) ITER
1 FORMAT(I2)
2 DUPL=O.
IFLG=l
CALL NTWRK(N)
00 10 J=eN
CALL CENTR (RADIRAD)
Yilr (RAD(1?)88,p9
IrC-I
9 IN=YRADC )
CALL DCSN(IN*IFLG)
10 CONTINUE
WRITE(5,11)DuPL
11 FORMAT(IX/10X,'TOTAL DUPLICATE STREET LENGTH s',F10.O)
ITER=ITER-1
IF (ITER)12912,2
12 CALL EXIT
END
// FOR
*ONE WORD INTEGERS
SUBROUTINE NTWRK (NODD)
INTEGER ARC(4,100)
DIMENSION XCORD(100)9 YCORD(100),DIST(4*100).KE (100)
CO4MON X CORDt YCORDAR C9DISTPKEY
C
C INiTIAL
NARC=O
DO 50 I11,100
XCORD(I)=0
YCORD(I)=0
KEY(I)=0
00 50 Jrl,4
ARC(JlzO
DIST (J, I) =0.0
50 CONTINUE
C INPUT ALL NODES AND ARCS OF THE STREET NET WORK
RE AD(8,1)NODES
I F0RMAT(12
Du 3 1=I rOLDES
READ(Si2) XCORD(I)s YCORD(I)gARC(leI)*ARC(2sI)#ARC^(3,1),.ARCC(4eI)
2 FORMAT (2F7.1*43)
3 CONTINUE
C
C INPUT NON-LINEAR ARC LENGTHS, IF ANY
READ(8,10) NL
10 FORMAT (12)
IF (NL) 19*19,11
11 00 19 1=1,NL
READ(8,12)NODE1vNODE2,CRV
12 FORMAT (213,F7.1)
00 13 J=1#4
IFC(ARC(JNODE1)-NODE2) 13914v13
13 CONTINUE
14 DIST(J,NODEI=CRV
00 15 J=1, 4
IF (ARC(JtN0DE2).-NODEI)
15 CONTINUE
16 DIST(JNODE2)=CRV
19 CONTINUE
15,16, 15
CALCULATE LINEAR ARC LENGTHS
DO 29 1=1,NODES
X= -XCORD(I)
Y= YCORD(I)
00 29 J=1,4
IF (ARC4JI)) 29,29,20
20 IF (DIST(JI)) 21,21,29
21 K=ARC(JI)
DX= XCORD(K) -X
22
23
29
DY= YCORD(K)-Y
SUMSQ= (DX*DX) + (DY*DY)
DIST (J, I) =SQRT (SUMSQ)
Do 22 J1=1,4
IF (ARC(J1,K)-I) 22,23,22
CONTINUE
DIST(J1,K)=DIST(JI)
CONT INUE
CO4PUTE TOTAL NETWORK LENGTH
DETERMINE ODD NODES AND/OR DUMMY
00 34 I=l#NODES
DO 30 J=1, 4
IF (ARC(J,I)) 33,31,33
33 SUM=SUM+DIST(JI)
NARC=NARC.l
30 CONTINUE
31 IF (J-3)3536, 35
35 IF (J-4) 34,32,34
36 KEY(I)=-I
GO TO 34
32 KEY(I)=1
NODD=NODD+1
34 C0NTI1NIVE
SUM=SUM/2.
NARC=NARC/2
-127-
r~.
C
C
C
C
C
C NODES
C
C PRINT NETWORK INFORMATION
WRITE(5937)
37 FORMAT('1 /SX91NETWORK INFORMATION'/)
WRITE(5.40)
40 FORMAT (IOX'NODE NO.',4XXCOORD',3X,'YCOORD',3X,'NODE',3X,*DIST.
5'93X,'NODE' 3X*'DIST.' 3X,*NODE' 3X,'DIST.' 3X'NODE' 3X,'DIST.'.
S3X,@ KEY 1///)
DO 42 I=1,NODES
WRITE(5941) It XCORD(Ile YCORD(I)*ARC(lelleDIST(lor)eARC(2elle
SDIST(2,1),ARC(3,I),OIST(3,I),ARC(4,I),DIST(49I)9KEY(I)
41 FORMAT(13x12,5XPF7,le3XF7.l3Xl2,2XF7.l,4Xl2,2XFT.1,4Xl2,
$2xoF7.lv4Xq1292X9FT~e4XopI2)
42 CONTINUE
WRITE(544)NARCNO0DSUM
44 FORMAT(lX/9X,'KEY NOTATZION'3X'ODD=1 3X,'EVEN=0'3X,'OUMMY=-1',
/IOX.*NUMBER OF ARCS=*15/10X'NUMBER OF ODD NODES21913/1O0TOTAL
5 LINEAR FEET OF STREET=*'Flo.0/)
X=N0DES* (NODES-I) /2
Y=NODD* (NODD-1)/2
SUM=1.
00 55 I=1910092
DX=NODD-I
SUMHSUM*DX
IF (NODD-X-1)51,51,55
55 CONTINUE
51 WRITE(5-52)XtY9SUM
52 FORMAT(1OXv'COMBINATORIAL STATISTICS'/15X,'NUMBER OF MINIMUM PATH
$COMPUTATIONS FOR ENTIRE NETWORK =f9E12.6/15X,'NUMBER OF POSSIBLE 0
SDD NODE PAIRS ='.2Ix9E12.6/15X,'NUMBER OF POSSIBLE PAIR COMBINATIO
SNS =9918X9E12.6/*1l)
WRITE (5960)
60 FORMAT(/////1OX,SOLUTION' 11X.'NODE PAIRS#.3X9'PATH LENGTHS6,
57X 'PATHS'//)
NODD=NODD/2
RETURN
END
// DUP
*STORE WS UA NTWRK
FO
E WORD INTEGERS
SUBROUTINE CENTR(RADIRAD)
SUBROUTINE CENTER COMPUTES MASS CENTER OF ACTIVE ODD NODES AND
RETURNS IN DESCENDING ORDER THE N MOST DISTANT ACT ODD NODES FROM
THIS CENTER, AND THEIR RESPECTIVE DISTANCES
INTEGER ARC(4,100
D14ENSION XCORO(100), YCORD(100),DIST(4,100),KEY(100)
DIMENSION DUM(100),IDUM(100),RAD(4),IRAD(4)
CO4MON XCORD, YCORDARCDISTKEY
//
*ON
C
C
C
C
c
C .
C
RAD= RADIUS OP N NODES, DESC. ORD
IRAD=FURTetEST N NODE NAMES
N=4
C
C COMPUTE (XoYO) FOR ACTIVE ODD NODES
00 5 1=1,100
IF (ARC(1,I))26,2
2 IF (KEY(I))5,5.3
3 XSUM=XSUM+X CORD(I)
YSUM=YSUM+YCORD (I)
0ENOM=DENOM+1.
IVI=IV1+1
IDUM (IV1) al
5 CONTINUE
6 IF (DENOM-2.)500,5007
7 XC=XSUM/DENI
YCrYSUM/DENOM
N=4
INITIALIZE VARIABLES
IV1=ND. OF ACTIVE ODD NODES
xC=X-CNTR YCay-CNTR
0I ! I=hv4
R AO (i z0.
1RAD ( 1) .
I CONT INUE
XSJM=O.
Y SUI0.DE NOM=0.
DX SUM=0O.
IVl=0
oillilk
R
I . f I
C
C COMPUTE RADIUS OF ACTIVE O00 NODES
00A1S IlIV1
J=IDUM(I)
DX=XC-XCORD(J)
DY=YC-YCORD(J)
DSQ= (DX*DX)+ (DY*OY)
DU4(I)=DSQ
15 CONT INUE
C SELECT FURTHEST M NODES
IF (IV1--N)19920920
l9 Nm= Iv1
20 00 22 J1loN
DO 21 1miIV1
IF (DUM(I)-BIG)21, 2123
23 BIG=DUM(1)
T8IG0IDUM(I)
IV2=1
21 CONTINUE
UM ('AVV2) =
IRADtJ)IBIG
RAD (J) SQRT (BIG)
22 CONTINUE
RETURN
500 IRADO)1DUM(l)
RETURN
END
Lf D UP
*STORE WS UA CENTR
// FOR
*ONE WORD INTEGERS
SUBRQUTINE OCSN(INIFLG1)
INTEGER PTH (3,13),PTS(3)
REAL LNIN(3),LNTH(3),MLNTH(3)
DIMENSION MTRX(4,4)tDMTRX(4, 2)IPTS(3),tMPT(3,13)
DIMENSION MPATH(13)
C
IF (IFLG1)100,191
I MTRX(1,1)=IN
00 30 K=1,4
IF (MTRX(K91))30,30,5
5 IN=MTRX(K,1)
INA=IN
CALL PPGEN(INLNINPTHPTS)
IF (K-l)0,6, 10
6 DO 7 1=1,3
MT RX(1+19e1) =PTS (I)
MLNTH (V) =LN IN (1)
00 7 J=ltl3
MPTH (IJ) =PT H(I, J)
7 CONT INUE
C
10 00 20 1=1,3
NPASS=1
IF (PTSMI)20920,11
11 INB=PTS(I)
12 CALL PPGEN(INBLNTHPTHIPTS)
13 CALL AMIN(LNTH3,1XSMALL)
IF (IX)15,14,15
14 LNIN(I)=14999,
60 TO 20
15 LNTH(IX)=1500.
IF (IPTS(IX)-IN)16q13, 16
16 If (IPTSQ(X)-INA)17T,13, 17
17 60 TO (1S.19)tNPASS
18 1NAiNB
INB=IPT S IX)
LNIN(IUMNIN(I-mS4ALL
NPASS=2
Go TO 12
19 LNIN(J)=LNIN(I)*SMALL
INA=IN
20 CO0JT!NUE
C.
CALL AMIN(LNIN*3*IXfSMALL)
.MTRX (I(2)=PTS(ZX)
TEMP.MSHALL
/ LNIN(IX)=160009
CALL AMIN(LNIN,39IXS4ALL)
MTRX(K#3) =PTS(IX)
UMTP"X (Kq 1) =SN4ALL-TEMP
TE;rPPSHALL
LNINIX)160000
CALL A1N(LNlNp3,IXiSt4ALL)
fr~d TRX((.o4)-APTS(1X)
30M~TRX Ms. 2) =SHALL-TEMP
30CON4TINUE
CALL 5COVR1(MTRX90MTRX91)
00 50 J 1*13
MPATH(J)=PTHr(fJ)
So CONTINUE
CALL PAIR(MTRX(1,1),HPATH,MLNTHQ())
RETURN
10(0 CALL PPGEN(114,LNlN9PTH.PTS)
CALL AiIN(LNIN,3,IXPSMALL)
DO Ifil1 1=1,13
101 MPATH(D=~PTH(lXoD)
CALL PAIR(INt?4PAT~tSMALL)
RETURN4
END
16STOfRE WS UA- DCSW
// FOR
*ONE WORD INTEGERS
SUBROUTINE PPGEN(IN*RLtKtVAR)
C PPGEN GENERATES THE THREE SHORTEST AND UNIQUE PATHS
c RADIATING FROM THE ACTIVE ODD NODE *IN$ TO OTHER
C ACTIVE ODD NODES* ALL OF WHICH ARE ALSO UNIQUE
INTEGER ARC(4,100)vS(6913),VAR(3)
DIMENSION XCORD(100)9 YCORD(100),DIST(4*100),KEY(100)
DIMENSION BRAN(9),IDENT(9,6),RL(3),K(3,13),SV(6)
COMMON XCORD, YCORDARCDISTKEY
00 1 1x1.13
DO 1 Jx196
SV (J) 315000.
I S (JI 1) X0
C
C EXAMINE THREE BRANCHES FROM ODD NODE #IN#
00 10 Ix1,3
KA=ARC(IIN)
S(IpI)xKA
Fla ICDLm2
SV (1) =DIST (I, IN)
3 Ir (KEY(KA))204*8,10
10 CO4TINUE
GO TO 500
C
C IF KA IS A DUMMY OR AN INACTIVE ODD NODE, LINK TO NEXT
C NODE, ADD DISTANCE9 NOTE CONTINUATION, AND TEST AGAIN
204 CALL DUMMY(KINKAKNEW,A)
IF (ICOL-14)205,207,207
205 S (I * ICOL) =KNEW
IC:L=ICOL+1
K =K 4A
KA=KNEW
IF (KA-IN)206,207,206
206 SV(I)'SV(I)#A
GO TO 3
20T SV(I)=15000.
GO TO 10
C
U
AI
C FROM KA, A'MAX OF 9 BRANCHES MUST BE ANALYZED
C INITIALIZE BRANCH DISTANCE AND 10 ARRAYS AND ROW COUNTER
C FROM KA, A MAX OF 12 BRANCHES MUST BE ANALYZED.
8 00 9 J=19
BRAN (J) 15000.
00 9 I14=16
9 IDENT(JIJ)=0 -
IROW=l
C
C GIVEN IS KA. KA IS AN EVEN NODE (4 BRANCHES)
00 30 JB=194
JCDL=l
KB=ARC (JBtKA)
IF (KB-KIN)12,30*12
12 IF (KB-IN)13,v30,13
13 BRAN(IROW) =DIST(J3KA)
IDENT (IROW9JCOL) =KB
JC't=JCOL+1
14 IF (KEY(KB)))215, 17,29
C IF KB IS A DUMMY OR AN INACTIVE ODD NODEr LINK TO NEXT
C NODEv ADD DISTANCEb NOTE CONTINUATION, AND TEST AGAIN
215 CALL DUMMY(KKAKBKNEWA)
IF (JCOL-6)216v216,219
216 IDENT(IROW9JCOL)=KNEW
JCDL=JCOL+1
KKA=KB
KB=KNEW
IF (KB-IN)217,219,217
217 IF (KB-KA)218*219*218
218 BRAN(IROW?=BRANCIROW)+A
GO TO 14
11 1 1 1.......-..... . 11Mmmun
219 BRAN(IROW)=15000.
GO TO 29
C
C GIVEN IS KB. KB IS AN EVEN NODE (4 BRANCHES)
17 TEMP=BRAN(IROW)
D- 18 N=JCOLt6
18 IDENT(IROW N)=0
DO 30 JC=1,4
JDCOL=JCOL
KC=ARC(JC.KB)
IF (KC-KKA) 19930,19
19 IF (KC-KA)20930,20
20 IF (KC-IN)21v,30,v21
21 BRAN(IROW)=TEMP+DIST(JCKB)
IDENT(IROW,JDCOL)=KC
JDCOL=JDCOL+1
KKB=KB
22 IF (KEY(KC))223,23925
23 BRAN(IROW)=15000.
Go TO 25
C
C ByPASS NON-EVEN NODES, NOTE, AND TEST AGAI
223 CALL DUMMY(KKBKCKNEWA)
IF (JDCOL-6)224t2249228
224 IDENT (IROWJDCOL)=KNEW
JDCOL =JDCOL+I
KKB=KC
KC=KNEW
IF (KC-IN)2259228,225
225 IF (KC-KA)22692289226
226 IF (KC-KB)22792289227
227 8RAN(1ROW)=BRAN(IROW)+A
GO TO 22
228 BRAN(IROW)=15000.
C
C START NEW PATH SEARCH
25 IF (JC-4)26,29,29
26 ITEMP=IROW+I
IVAR=JCOL-1
DO 27 JL=1,IVAR
27 IDENT(ITEMPJL)=IDENT(IROWJL)
29 IROW=IROW+1
30 CONTINUE
C
C SELECT THE MIN PATH AND AN ALTERNATE
NPASS=1
IVAR=O
40 CALL AMIN(BRAN, 91IVARtSMALL)
IF (NPASS-1)42941,42
41 IF (IVAR)10960,46
42 IF (IVAR)10,1046
C
C PLACE THESE IN PRIMARY AND SECONDARY LOCATIONS IN SAVE ARRAYS
46 GO TO (47.49),NPASS
47 TEMP=SV(I)
ICLMN=ICOL-1
DO 48 MCOL=1,ICLMN
48 S (1+39MCOL) =S (I MCOL)
49 IROW=1+3'(NPASS-1)
SV (IROW) =TEMP+BRAN (IVAR)
BRAN(IVAR)=15000.
DO So JFIl,6
ICLe=ICOL+JF-1
50 S(IROWPICL2)=IDENT(IVARJF)
NP ASS=NP ASS+1
IVAR=wl
GO TO (40940,10),NPASS
C
60 SV(I)l15000.
0 TO 10
C
C
C FINISH
C FIND TERMINAL NODE FOR EACH PRIMARY PATH
500 00 53 1=193
DO 51 J=2#13
IF (S(loJ))51,53951
51 CONTINUE
J=14
53 VAR(I) S(l9J-1)
C
C ARE THERE DUPLICATE TERMINAL NODES
J=
IF (VAR(1)-VAR(Z))103,101,103
101 IF (SV(i) -SV(2))102l02110
102 J=2
GO TO 110
103 IF (VAR(C)-VAR(3))1069104,106
104 IF (SV(1)-SV(2))105#1059110
105 J=3
GO TO 110
106 IF (VAR(2)-VAR(3))130107,130
107 F(SV(2)-SV(3))10S9108#109
108 J=_3
60 TO 110
109 J=2
C
C FIND MIN SECONDARY PATH
110 1VAR=0
SMALL=15000.
D 112 1=4,6
IF (SMAL L-SV(I))112,1121l1
1 SMALLSV(I)
IVAR=I
112 CONTINUE
IF (IVAR)113,1309113
C REPLACE DUPLICATE- BY MIN SECONDARY PATH
N430dd VO ~I 3dOLS*
C N3 c
(Clso3 300N JO SH~deG C NP4J.IA S300N 000 3AI13V ONO'XOT IVN4;i0 08
NUNl. 3m1
3flNIN0O 9L
I-Nfl031=NlG:)I SL
qL~SL9qL(*OOOSin(1)Ib) .JI
C61=1 tc 00Ot
oos 01 00
(1'8VAI)S=(i'r)s tit
C16T=1 tit 00
*OOOSt= (dVAI) AS
11VHS=(r)AS Ell
/ FOR
*ONE WORD INTEGERS
SUBROUTINE DUMMY (KORGKDUMKNEWA)
C DUMMY ENABLES BYPASSING OF INACTIVE ODD NODES AND DUMMY NODES
INTEGER ARC(4,100)
DIMENSION xCORD(100), YCORD(100)tDIST(4,100),KEY(1oo)
COMMON XCORD, YCORDARCDISTKEY
00 3 1=1,4
IF (ARC(IKDUM))3,10,2
2 IF (ARC*(IKDUM)-KORG)4,3,4
3 CO4TINUE
0 TO 10
4 KNEW=ARC (IKDUM)
A=DIST (UKDUM)
RETURN
10 WRITE(S l1)KDUM
11 FORMAT(5XERROR IN SUBRT. DUMMY, KDUM3',I6)
CALL EXIT
END
//DUP
*STORFE WS UA DUMMY
/ FOR
*ONE WORD INTEGERS
SUBROUTINE AMIN(A*NPIROWtSMALL)
C SUBROUTINE AMIN RETURNS THE MINIMUM VALUE AND ITS ELEMENT NUMBER (IROW)
DIMENSION A(12)
SMALL=15000.
IROWN0
00 2 I1l1N
IF (SMALL-A(I))2,2,1
.1 SMALL=A(I)
IROWuI
2 CONTINUE
RETURN
END
/ DUP
*STORE WS UA AMIN
// FOR
*ONE WORD INTEGERS
SUBROUTINE PAIR ( INPATHPLNTH)
C SUBROUTINE PAIR LINKS THE OPTIMAL PAIR OF ACTIVE ODD NODES9 SETS
C THESE TO INACTIVE STATES AND REMOVES ARCS ALONG THE PATH FROM
C THE NETWORK SEARCH AS THEY HAVE NOW BEEN DUPLICATED ONCE.
INTEGER ARC(4,100),PATH(13)
DIMENSION XCORD(100),g YCORD(100),DIST(4,100),KEY(0oo)
COMMON XCORD, YCORDARCDISTvKEY9DUPL
DUPL=DUPL+PLNTH
K ININ
1=1
NODE=PATH(1)
1 Do 2 J=,4
IF (ARC(JIN)-NODE)2,3,2
2 CONTINUE
3 ARC(JIN)=-ARC(JIN)
KEY(IN)=-1
DO 4 J=1, 4
IF (ARC(JNODE)-IN)4,5,4
4 CONTINUE
.5 ARC(J9NODE)=-ARC(JNODE)
KEY (NODE) =-1
IN=NODE
NODE=PATH(I)
IF (NODE)1,6,1
6 N=I-1
WRITE(5,7)KININPLNTHKIN, (PATH(J) ,Jz1N)
7 FORMAT(30X,13,2X,13,SXF8.0,7X,14I4)
RETURN
END
DUD
*STORE VS UA PAIR
// FOR
*ONE WORD INTEGERS
SUBROUTINE SCORi (M9DM, ITH)
C SUBROUTINE SCORI EVALUATES NODE PREFERENCES AND WEIGHTS
C AND RETURNS ROW NUMBER OF LOWEST SCORING NODE
DIMENSION M (4,4) ,DM(4,2) ,SCORE(3)
IN=M(lI l)
C.
DO 13 1=13
SCORE(I)=0.
IF (M(1,3).M(+1.l))11.,l0,1
10 SCORE(I)=DM(1,1)
GO TO 13
11 IF (4(1s4)-M(I111))13t12,1l3
12 SCORE(Il=DM(1,2)+DM(1,1)'
13 CONTINUE
C
00 30 K2294
IF (M(K,2)-IN)20,24,20
20 SCORE(K-1)=DM(K,1)+SCORE(K-1)
IF (M(K3)-IN)22,30922
22 SCORE (K-1)=SCORE (K-1)+0M(Ke2)
0 TO 30
24 SCORE(K-1)=-DM(K,1)tSCORE(K-1)
30 CONTINUE
C
CALL AMIN(SCORE,3,ITHPSMALL)
RETURN
END
// DUP
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black petitioners of MIssissippi town demand paved streets, lights,
and police services equal to those of white community.
6. Civil Disorders Report, p. 147.
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